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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN CYBERSPACE 
 
JON M. GARON* 
 
Changes in technology and economic power have radically shifted 
the media landscape in the United States and throughout the world. Despite 
this, the regulatory model being used was adopted in 1996 at the dawn of 
the Internet age or inherited from Congresses earlier legislative efforts. 
This article assesses the constitutional enforcement of existing 
administrative regulations and address the incongruities between the 
current administrative practices, the public expectations of the government, 
and the free press for the next generation. 
Despite a long history of governmental mistrust, the independent 
press and the self-regulated entertainment industries have had a 
tremendous role in shaping the culture and economy of the United States. 
At certain points in United States history, the government has attempted to 
regulate aspects of the free press and the entertainment media, 
notwithstanding the constitutional mandate of the First Amendment. The 
conflict between free speech and free media began early in United States 
history with the Alien and Sedition Acts passed in 1798. The conflict has 
played a significant role in the development of defamation laws, privacy 
laws, intellectual property laws, and telecommunications regulations, 
including those which led to the formation of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). 
Perhaps the most notorious example of the effort to regulate news, 
entertainment, and public expression arose during the operations of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the Senate 
Government Operations Committee Subcommittee on Investigations led by 
Senator Joe McCarthy. Through the anti-communist witch-hunts of HUAC 
 
*  Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College 
of Law; J.D. Columbia Law School 1988. This article was prepared as part of the 
Belmont Law Review Symposium, Contemporary Issues in Administrative Law, 
January 15, 2021. The author wishes to thank his research assistant, Feng Xiao, for 
his assistance with the development of the article. 
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and the McCarthy hearings, thousands of entertainers, teachers, and other 
professionals were fired or imprisoned for their political beliefs. 
In a series of legislative actions during the 1990s, the federal 
government sought to regulate the Internet in much the same manner as it 
had previously sought to regulate motion pictures, comic books, television, 
trademarks, and the press. The Communications Decency Act and the Child 
Online Protection Act reflected a broad-based attempt to regulate the 
Internet, but these laws were found unconstitutional in Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union.1 The Supreme Court did not strike down section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act, which reversed common law privacy 
and defamation law for online publishers. Similarly, despite the decision in 
Reno, in the same year the Supreme Court upheld limited content 
regulation on broadcast and cable television.2  
Much has changed since 1997, however, including the emergence 
and dominance of social media publishers such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and other global enterprises that dominate access to journalism, 
entertainment, and public discourse. These companies regularly run afoul 
of regulations regarding data privacy and customer disclosure framed 
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and 
similar state laws. In addition, broadcast and cable television systems, 
regulated under Turner, are becoming Internet streaming and downloading 
platforms, distributing programs in a format that may radically change the 
basis on which the Telecommunications Act bases its jurisdiction.3  
This article addresses the change in media and the changing role of 
the FCC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It highlights the trend to 
exert content and viewpoint control on protected speech and identifies the 
limited role for administrative agencies going forward.  
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1.  Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
2.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997). 
3.  See Joseph L. Gattuso, The United States Telecommunications Act of 
1996, GLOBAL COMMS. INTERACTIVE (1998), [https://perma.cc/TZ2H-UJXN]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the strong prohibition of the First Amendment that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press. . .,”4 Congress has made many efforts to do so in the past and 
continues to do so through administrative agencies such as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). The government actions sometimes come from executive action, 
while at other times they are promoted by committees of both the House 
and Senate. Congress uses its hearing process to create public pressure on 
citizens, using public pressure to achieve a result that would otherwise be 
barred by constitutional protections. 
The efforts to regulate culture and morality through laws, executive 
actions, administrative policies, and public hearings began with the 
founding of the republic. At the same time, however, the twenty-first 
century understanding of the Bill of Rights has substantially expanded the 
rights of citizens to be free from interference by the government, shifting 
the tools for the state’s regulatory power away from legislation and towards 
actions that have fewer safeguards. These efforts are highlighted by the use 
of interim regulatory guidelines and executive orders, neither of which has 
significant public oversight or control. 
Section one of this article briefly reviews the history of morality 
legislation, including the Alien and Sedition Acts, the McCarthy Hearings, 
the Title IX regulations of 2012-18, and the restriction on the Paycheck 
Protection Program (PPP) loans for the adult entertainment industry. 
Section two then looks at the significant shifts in popular culture driven by 
the rise of social media and the decline of terrestrial broadcasting, which is 
the basis for many of the FCC regulations. Section three maps the 
intersection between the political practice of legislating morality under the 
current interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the modern online public 
sphere. In doing so, the article posits that the expansion of the individual 
rights promoted by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of case law under 
the First Amendment, Second Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment, 
coupled with the lack of the government’s ability to craft narrowly tailored 
regulations for social media, online content, and privacy interests, leave the 
state powerless to diminish or regulate communications or interactions on 
the Internet. At the same time, however, there remain traditional common 
law protections for individuals that are as significant as those rights 
protected by the Constitution. Congress—but not the administrative 
agencies—does have the power to reduce preferential treatment to the tech 
sector by curtailing the laws it enacted in the 1990s to promote the 
emergence of these industries. 
 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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I.  CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT REGULATION FROM THE FOUNDING OF 
THE NATION TO TODAY 
The history of efforts to regulate the press and media of the nation 
is as old as the nation itself. Within ten years of the passing of the Bill of 
Rights, the Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
designed to thwart public support for the bloody revolutionary zeal 
sweeping Europe and to undermine the political aspirations of Thomas 
Jefferson’s Republican efforts to remove the Federalists from power.5 As 
vice president, Jefferson led the Republicans against the Federalist 
President, John Adams, and the Federalist Congress which was only 
nominally loyal to his party. Jefferson and the Republicans favored support 
of France despite the violence of its revolution and threat to export its 
military enlightenment to neighboring nations through war and terrorism. 
The Federalists, in support of the United States' former enemy, Great 
Britain, looked to a new alliance to stabilize trade and to shore up its 
political fortunes.6  
To address the threat of revolution being imported into the United 
States from abroad, Congress enacted a series of four laws: The Alien Act, 
the Sedition Act, the Nationalization Act, and the Alien Enemies Act.7 Of 
these, the Sedition Act was the most direct assault on speech. It provided 
criminal sanction for anyone who would write or publish “any false, 
scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the 
United States, or either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . . with 
intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or 
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of 
the good people of the United States.”8 
Understood as political weapons rather than wartime protections, 
the Alien and Sedition Acts resulted in a public outcry against the 
 
5.  See Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and 
the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 438 (2007) 
(“Swept up in the fear and political momentum of a cold war with France, the 
Federalist Congress, under the leadership of President John Adams, passed the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, which authorized the removal of dangerous aliens and 
effectively criminalized political dissent.”). 
6.  See Joseph Russomanno, The Right and the Duty: Jefferson, Sedition and 
the Birth of the First Amendment's Central Meaning, 23 COMM. L. & POL'Y 49, 65 
(2018) (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 16 (2004)) 
(describing the political drama against “an ‘atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and 
intrigue’”). 
7. Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired 1801) 
(authorizing deportation of any foreigner deemed dangerous to national security); 
Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 
1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired 1802). 
8. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596. 
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incumbent Federalist regime and provided Jefferson the platform needed to 
reverse the Federalist monopoly over the newly formed nation. 
Biographers, David McCullough9 and Ron Chernow,10 both note that these 
provisions were among the gravest of political mistakes made by Adams 
and the most harmful to his legacy, his “Achilles’ heel.”11 
The zealous efforts to stop the press from attacking the Federalists 
backfired, prompting the growth of many additional Republican 
newspapers and publications. The use of the Sedition Act to stop the 
perceived harms caused by the sometimes vitriolic press resulted in two 
dozen successful actions, but there were also many more under common 
law defamation and various state laws.12 Worse, the prosecutions chosen 
under the Sedition Act were closer to the type of seditious speech against 
the sovereign that had been put aside as part of the revolutionary war, rather 
than the knowingly false, factual speech considered defamatory today.13 
While the Sedition Act was clearly intended to be a law to suppress 
speech, many of its critics focused on the use of federal law to govern libel, 
which was a state police power not granted to the federal government.14 
Jefferson was a fierce advocate of states’ rights, and he adhered to the 
James Madison view of the nation’s need for competing factions as the 
bullwork against a tyrannical federal government.15 Continued state 
sovereignty was one of these key components. 
James Madison describes the cause and cure in The Federalist 
Paper number ten: 
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most 
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of 
public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, 
that our governments are too unstable, that the public good 
is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that 
 
9. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 504–06 (2001). 
10. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 569 (2004). 
11. Wendell Bird, New Light on the Sedition Act of 1798: The Missing Half of 
the Prosecutions, 34 LAW & HIST. REV. 541, 541 (2016) (providing scholarship to 
establish that there were likely closer to thirty prosecutions under the common law 
and the Sedition Act instead of the seventeen most historians attributed to the 
actions.). 
12. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1699, 1710–12 (1991). 
13. See id. at 1711 (“None involved the sort of personal slander today thought 
of as libel. . . . Matthew Lyon . . . was convicted on the basis of two letters to the 
editors of newspapers . . . attack[ing] Adams' ‘continual grasp for power’ and his 
‘unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.’”). 
14. Id. 1711–12 (“Just as the Anti-Federalists had feared, a national 
government bent on consolidating power sought to use censorship to short-circuit 
political checks on its expansionist ambitions.”).  
15. Id. 1709–13. 
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measures are too often decided, not according to the rules 
of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. . . . 
The two great points of difference between a democracy 
and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, 
in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the 
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater 
sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. . 
. . 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within 
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a 
general conflagration through the other States. A religious 
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the 
Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the 
entire face of it must secure the national councils against 
any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for 
an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or 
for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to 
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular 
member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is 
more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an 
entire State. 
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, 
we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most 
incident to republican government. . . .16 
Had the Sedition Act been declared unconstitutional or truly 
repudiated, it might have been an early turning point in the development of 
free speech jurisprudence. But despite the opprobrium in which these Acts 
were held, the laws were never struck down for violating the Constitution.17 
 
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 255 (C.C.D. Va. 
1800) (No. 14,709) (“I cannot conceive that a right is given to the petit jury to 
determine whether the statute (under which they claim this right) is constitutional 
or not. . . . I cannot possibly believe that congress intended, by the statute, to grant 
a right to a petit jury to declare a statute void. . . . [T]his right is expressly granted 
to the judicial power of the United States, and is recognized by congress by a 
perpetual statute.”); see also Yassky, supra note 12, at 1711 (“The Supreme Court, 
in an act of cowardice spurred, perhaps, by its institutional insecurity (Marbury 
being five years in the future), refused to hear argument on the constitutionality of 
the Sedition Act; indeed, every Justice on the all-Federalist Court expressed 
approval of the Act in opinions delivered on circuit.”). 
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“To the contrary, throughout the first 150 years of the First Amendment, 
federal courts regularly enforced severe restrictions on citizens' ability to 
speak freely.”18 
Moreover, as noted by the common law cases brought during the 
period and the numerous cases brought by Federalists and Republicans 
alike under state laws,19 the concern was about the power of the federal 
government to enter into a regulatory domain controlled by the states, rather 
than concerns over the power of the state to suppress seditious speech. This 
was true even at the top of the Republican ticket. “Jefferson never protested 
against the substantive law of seditious libel, not even during the later 
Sedition Act controversy. He directed his protests at that time against 
national as opposed to state prosecutions for verbal crimes.”20 
The governmental power to regulate seditious libel did not dissipate 
through the disrepute of the Alien and Sedition Acts. More than a century 
later, Socialist Party champion Eugene Debs received a ten-year prison 
sentence for his opposition to the United States involvement in World War I 
under the Espionage Act, the twentieth-century successor to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.21 
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes laid the groundwork for Deb’s 
conviction in an earlier case the same year. In Schenck v. United States,22 
Justice Holmes articulated the basis for the World War I sedition cases in 
language that could easily have defended the Alien and Sedition Acts as 
well: 
 
18. Yassky, supra note 12, at 1700; see also Communist Party of the U.S. v. 
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 165–66 (1961) (“The ‘balancing 
test’ of First Amendment freedoms is said to justify laws aimed at the advocacy of 
overthrow of the Government ‘as speedily as circumstances would permit.’ Thus, 
the ‘test’ being used here is identical to the arguments used to justify the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798. . . . The unprecedented incorporation into our constitutional 
law of this time-worn justification for tyranny has been used to break down even 
the minimal protections of the First Amendment forged by Mr. Justice Holmes and 
Mr. Justice Brandeis which would bar prosecution for speech or writings in all 
cases except those in which the words used ‘so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate 
check is required to save the country.’”). 
19. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN 
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 61–64 (1986). 
20. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1999). 
21. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212–16 (1919) (“The defendant . . . 
said that the master class has always declared the war and the subject class has 
always fought the battles—that the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to 
lose, including their lives; that the working class, who furnish the corpses, have 
never yet had a voice in declaring war and have never yet had a voice in declaring 
peace.”). 
22. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, 
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose. 
. . . We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within their constitutional rights. 
The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It 
is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at 
war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.23 
The Espionage Act had a broader impact on speech. The law 
contained prohibitions on obtaining information, taking photographs, 
copying descriptions, or otherwise collecting data that could be used to 
harm the national defense or provide an advantage to foreign nations.24 The 
law was also used to deny access to the mail system. By 1918, “74 
newspapers had been denied mailing privileges.”25 In comparison, the 
government used the Espionage Act much more widely during World War I 
than it used the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1800 or the government used the 
Espionage Act during World War II.  During World War I “some fifteen 
hundred prosecutions were carried out under the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts, resulting in more than a thousand convictions.”26 
Justice Holmes moved away from his own approach in Abrams v. 
United States,27 not because he was repudiating his recently articulated 
“clear and present danger” test but because the Yiddish leaflet calling 
President Wilson a coward and hypocrite, and its call to action for a general 
strike, had no practical consequence.28 Whether or not the dissent by 
 
23. Id. at 51–52, see also United States v. Am. Socialist Soc’y., 260 F. 885, 
891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). 
24. The Sedition Act of 1918 (Pub. L. 65–150, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) 
(amending and expanding Espionage Act of 1917). 
25. David Asp & Deborah Fisher, Espionage Act of 1917, FIRST AM. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 2019), [https://perma.cc/KQ2T-CBLC]. 
26. PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 94 
(1991). 
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
28. Id. at 625, 628 (“[N]obody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of 
a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate 
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Holmes29 signaled an attempt to add teeth to the clear and present danger 
test, it failed to do so, leaving the law of sedition to await curtailment for 
another half-century.30 In addition, Holmes may also have been disturbed 
by the widespread and branching use of the indictments under an 
interpretation he had hoped would narrow their application. His dissent did 
not stem the tide.31 
The use of espionage and sedition laws did not have the same 
magnitude during World War II.32 Instead, however, the government went 
further. President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066.33 
That order, issued after the United States was at war with Japan, declared 
that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible 
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense 
material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. . . .” It 
included the forced curfew of people of Japanese ancestry in some areas 
designated as West Coast military areas and created exclusion areas for 
other regions that were enforced using internment camps. 
Despite the benign language, the Executive Order was carried out 
through the forced removal of all Japanese residents of California into 
internment camps. 
From the end of March to August, approximately 112,000 
persons were sent to “assembly centers” – often racetracks 
or fairgrounds – where they waited and were tagged to 
 
danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have 
any appreciable tendency to do so.”). 
29. Id. (“But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the 
principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger 
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a 
limit to the expression of opinion.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
30. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (a state could not forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force, except where such advocacy is directed 
toward producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.). 
31. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951) ((Writing in 
dissent, Justice Douglas give voice to the frustrations of the failure to protect free 
speech under the clear and present danger test: “[U]pholding law prohibiting 
advocacy of violence because it involves such danger to the security to the republic 
that the State may outlaw it) The restraint to be constitutional must be based on 
more than fear, on more than passionate opposition against the speech, on more 
than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be some immediate injury to 
society that is likely if speech is allowed.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927). 
32. See Philip A. Dynia, World War II, FIRST AM. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
[https://perma.cc/GA6Y-NJP4]. 
33. Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7 Fed. Reg. 
1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).  
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indicate the location of a long-term “relocation center” that 
would be their home for the rest of the war. Nearly 70,000 
of the evacuees were American citizens. There were no 
charges of disloyalty against any of these citizens, nor was 
there any vehicle by which they could appeal their loss of 
property and personal liberty.34 
The constitutionality of the interments was questioned in 
Korematsu v. United States.35 Like the Supreme Court at the time of the 
French Revolution and World War I, the Supreme Court again chose to 
ignore the actual conduct of the government to rule in its favor: 
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of 
imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely 
because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry 
concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the 
United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, 
were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal 
citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. 
Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and 
relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call 
them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations 
that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing 
but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of 
racial prejudice, without reference to the real military 
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded 
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because 
the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take 
proper security measures, because they decided that the 
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens 
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast 
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its 
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as 
inevitably it must—determined that they should have the 
power to do just this.36 
 
34. Japanese-American Internment During World War II, U.S. NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation 
[https://perma.cc/DJ22-5KXE].  
35. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
36. Id. at 223.  
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Given this abject failure to recognize the constitutional rights of its 
citizens and residents, it should come as little surprise that Congress and the 
courts continued to ignore limitations imposed by the Constitution 
following World War II, particularly with regard to concerns over the 
communist threat espoused in Abrams.37 In the 1950s, the government 
returned to the Wilson era practice of hunting down potential dissidents for 
their political views. 
The concerns over Communist sympathizers that began with the 
Russian Revolution and the interplay of communism with the prosecution 
of World War I continued through World War II and into the emerging 
Cold War.38 Beginning in 1938, the House Un-American Committee of the 
House of Representatives (“HUAC”) began to focus on communist 
infiltration into American industries, including that of motion pictures.39 
The HUAC was joined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in 
1942, which initiated an investigation into “Communist Infiltration of the 
Motion Picture Industry.”40 
The HUAC had broad authority to investigate: 
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American 
propaganda activities in the United States,  
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and 
un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign 
countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle 
 
37. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
38. See, e.g., Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and 
the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 30–31 (1995) (“The maximum 
communist programme is well illustrated in Lenin’s uncompromising statement 
that ‘as long as capitalism and Socialism remain, we cannot live in peace. In the 
end one or another will triumph.”); JAMES SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD 
WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 109 (2011) (presidential 
contender Thomas E. Dewey “asserted, “the Communists are seizing control of the 
New Deal, through which they aim to control the Government of the United 
States”). 
39. Erica Bose, Three Brave Men: An Examination of Three Attorneys Who 
Represented the Hollywood Nineteen in the House Un-American Activities 
Committee Hearings in 1947 and the Consequences They Faced, 6 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 321, cmt. at 323 (1999) (“H.U.A.C. first appeared as a special committee in 
1938. . . . [I]t spent much of its first six years trying to prove that Communists 
dominated such New Deal organizations as the Federal Theatre Project, the C.I.O., 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority.”). 
40. DANIEL J. LEAB,  A GUIDE TO THE MICROFILM EDITION OF FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CONFIDENTIAL FILES, COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE 
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, FBI SURVEILLANCE FILES ON HOLLYWOOD, 1942–
1958 intro. at v–x (1991). 
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of the form of government as guaranteed by our 
Constitution, and  
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid 
Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.41  
The investigations were predominately focused on communist 
infiltrations and heavily influenced by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI 
investigations. Hollywood had been a HUAC target a number of times, but 
the focus grew with the FBI reports, culminating in particularly explosive 
hearings in 1947 and again in 1951–52.42 
[T]he FBI throughout much of the 1940s and 1950s "was 
selling its own brand of anti-Communism"—and one of its 
most important clients was HUAC, through which material 
from the bureau's confidential files became "public 
information" that could spread fears about radicalism 
"without compromising the FBI's image of a disinterested, 
nonpartisan, investigative agency."43 
The 1947 investigation was triggered by FBI and HUAC 
investigations that identified Gerhart Eisler, a Hollywood composer, as a 
spy for the Communist International Party.44 As a Hollywood composer, 
Eisler opened the door to more Hollywood investigations and accusations. 
The HUAC initially subpoenaed 41 individuals.45 “Over the course of five 
days, a total of twenty-two witnesses eventually denounced over one-
hundred men and women as members of the Hollywood branch of the 
Communist Party.”46 The threat of Communism—or the threat of federal 
regulation—motivated Louis B. Mayer, Walt Disney, Samuel Goldwyn, 
Harry Cohn, Barney Balaban, Albert Warner, Jack Warner, and other studio 
 
41. H.R. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 83 CONG. REC. 7568 (1938); see Martin H. 
Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, and the First 
Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2001). 
42. LEAB, supra note 40, at vi. (“[T]he 1947 HUAC hearings dealing with the 
movies and obviously based on FBI information was called by the committee 
‘[h]earings dealing with Communist infiltration of the movie industry.’ Related 
hearings held in 1951-52 dealt with ‘Communist infiltration of [the] Hollywood 
motion picture industry.’”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
43. Id. 
44. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 
359–415 (1998) (“By the end of the war, the FBI believed it had a big fish on the 
line. Eisler’s apparently furtive behavior . . . gave plausibility to that 
characterization. . . .”). See also Redish & McFadden, supra note 41, at 1680. 
45. Redish & McFadden, supra note 41, at 1681. 
46. Id. (quoting ROBERT VAUGHN, ONLY VICTIMS 324 (1972)).  
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heads to promise an expungement of communists from the ranks of 
Hollywood.47 
The HUAC also used its influence to control the staff of the FCC, 
helping to assure that the administrative agencies involved in radio and 
television—the federally regulated siblings of the motion picture industry—
were under the same philosophical approach.48 
“[T]he FCC played a pivotal role in the political and social crisis 
that enveloped the United States regarding the Red Scare.”49 “The battles 
between the FCC and Congress took their toll on the staff members and 
political will of the FCC, so that eventually, the individuals targeted 
withdrew from the agency and the political stance reversed itself, 
supporting a more politically conservative agenda sought by those involved 
with the fight.”50 
Even though the constitutional understanding of the First 
Amendment was beginning to undergo significant change in the 1960s with 
decisions on defamation51 and incitement,52 the regulation of broadcasting 
was still under administrative control. 
The FCC initially invoked its normative standards in a “fairness” 
standard.53 Later, concerned that the decades of anti-Communist 
intimidation were coming to an end, the FCC sought to further its 
normative agenda on speech regulation through administrative changes 
requiring broadcasters to provide a “right of reply”54 to candidates for 
 
47. VAUGHN, supra note 46, at 76–80. 
48. See SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE RED SCARE, POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 1941–1960, 2–4 (2004) (describing the post-war 
Communist scare as largely motivated by a conservative backlash against the 
progressive social landscape of President Roosevelt’s New Deal.). 
49.  Id. at 88. 
50. Jon M. Garon, Hidden Hands That Shaped the Marketplace of Ideas: 
Television's Early Transformation From Medium to Genre, 19 U. DENVER SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 29, 63 (2016). See also BRINSON, supra note 48, at 88. 
51. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (replacing clear and 
present danger test with imminent lawless action test allowing prohibition of 
speech "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" only if it is 
"likely to incite or produce such action."). 
53. In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 
(1949). See Roscoe L. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for 
Electronic and Print Media, 26 Hastings L.J. 659 (1975); Thomas J. Houser, 
Fairness Doctrine--An Historical Perspective, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 550 
(1972); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: 
A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (1985). 
54. Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1959) (superseded) (“315. 
Candidates for public office; facilities; rules. (a) If any licensee shall permit any 
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a 
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates 
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political office. The effect of the right of reply requirement was to 
discourage the participation of the broadcasters in advocatorial politics.55 
These efforts were not new. Writing in 1975 about government interference 
with the press, Professor Roscoe Barrow noted— 
Governmental activities deemed repressive of the media 
have taken several forms. Then Vice President Spiro 
Agnew and other administration spokesmen attacked the 
media for bias. Newspersons were subjected to selective 
investigation by federal agencies, and federal suits were 
brought to require them to reveal their sources. 
Newspersons' telephones were tapped. A taped 
conversation between President Nixon and staff members 
disclosed a threat to encourage challenges to the 
Washington Post's applications for renewal of its radio and 
television station licenses because the Washington Post had 
a leading role in reporting the Watergate events. In the 
view of the media, the Office of Telecommunications 
Policy (OTP) was politicized and its director, 
recommended a "carrot and stick" approach to induce 
favorable comment by broadcasters on the Nixon 
administration's performance.56 
The Supreme Court upheld these powers of a regulatory agency to 
regulate the broadcast industry. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal 
Communications Commission,57 the Supreme Court upheld the 
administrative agencies’ interpretations of the Federal Communication Act 
on the basis that they “enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech 
and press protected by the First Amendment.”58 
In much the same way the Supreme Court repeatedly failed to reign 
in the abuse of sedition and syndicalization laws, the Court also gave great 
deference to the FCC. In upholding the fairness doctrine and right of reply 
statutes to regulate broadcasters, the Court first reasserted that it had made 
 
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station. . . . ”). See also Applicability 
of the Fairness Doctrine in Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 
29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 25, 1964). 
55. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 53, at 152–53 (“The Fairness 
Doctrine thus stands as a symbol of what Americans hope for from the radio and 
television industry: neutral, detached presentation of significant public issues. Such 
reportage should inform without indoctrinating, producing an enlightened citizenry 
but avoiding manipulation of voters' values by an entrenched, uncontrollable 
oligopoly motivated solely by a desire to maximize its own profits.”). 
56. Barrow, supra note 53, at 660 n.7 (internal citations omitted). 
57. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
58. Id. at 375. 
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the correct antitrust holding in National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States,59 which forced CBS to divest itself of half of its radio stations to 
promote competition in keeping with the FCC’s mandate to license in the 
public interest.60 The denial of a station license, the Supreme Court 
explains, “is not a denial of free speech” when ordered “in the public 
interest.”61 
The Court cited to a long history of regulating broadcasters as 
consistent with the First Amendment62 and pointed to the divergent 
regulatory models between those of the printed press and those of the 
broadcasters: 
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the 
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in 
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this 
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their 
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to 
have the medium function consistently with the ends and 
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount.63 
Finally, the Court dismissed speculation that the regulations chilled 
speech64 or were becoming anachronistic due to the development of 
technological innovations that would overcome scarcity.65 As with its many 
opportunities to protect speech rather than the governmental interest, the 
Supreme Court chose to protect the regulators. To this date, while Red Lion 
has been the subject of much criticism, it has yet to be overruled by the 
Supreme Court.66 
 
59.  Id. at 388–89. 
60.  Id. at 389 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)). 
61.  Id. 
62. Id. at 394 (“[T]he Commission for 40 years has been choosing licensees 
based in part on their program proposals.”). 
63. Id. at 390. 
64.  Id. at 392–93 (“[B]roadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship 
and their coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least 
rendered wholly ineffective. . . . At this point, however, as the Federal 
Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best 
speculative.”). 
65. Id. 
66.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 
(1994) (“Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale 
since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support 
for our broadcast jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here. . . . [C]able 
television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the 
broadcast medium.”) (internal citation omitted); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 
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Although the history of incursions on free speech focuses on the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the application of various executive 
orders, regulatory procedures, and legislative acts, there is an important 
aspect of the administrative agency’s ability to impact First Amendment 
rights without resort to the courts.67 The FCC, for example, continues to 
enforce regulations on cross-ownership of broadcasting and in children’s 
advertising.68 By 1990, Congress recognized that the social norms driving 
children’s programming were eroding as more affluent homes shifted to 
cable for their children’s content. The shift left those reliant on free 
broadcasting without appropriate programming for their families. By 1990, 
for example, the average amount of hours of children’s television had 
dropped to only two hours produced each week, compared with eleven 
hours produced a decade earlier.69 Congress enacted legislation and called 
upon the FCC for appropriate implementing regulations.70  
These regulations provided an important public service, particularly 
given the growing disparity between those citizens who can afford their 
news, education, and entertainment content.71 At the same time, however, 
these were content-based restrictions negotiated with the companies being 
regulated by the regulator. As such, the process and the outcome of the 
regulations fell well below the Supreme Court’s standards for upholding 
such regulations. 
It remains an open question of whether children’s content 
requirements are content-based or content-neutral regulations. “Regulations 
which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of 
the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.” Favoring 
children’s content over other forms of news and entertainment is certainly a 
form of content preference, even if it is merely a categorical one.72 In 
 
(1981) (upholding broadcasters obligations to provide time for national political 
candidates); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) 
(upholding Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) while refusing to extend it to print 
media). 
67. See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Opens Door to Increased Consolidation in TV 
Industry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2017, at B2; FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, 
FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-review-
broadcast-ownership-rules (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).  
68.  See Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–437, 104 Stat. 
996–1000 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2010)). 
69. S. REP. NO. 101–66, at 3 (1989). See Joel Timmer, Changes in the 
Children’s Television Marketplace, the Children’s Television Act, and the First 
Amendment, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 731, 736 (2019). 
70. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, 
11 FCC Rcd. 10660, ¶ 5 (1996). 
71. Jon M. Garon, Dysregulating the Media: Digital Redlining, Privacy 
Erosion, and the Unintentional Deregulation of American Media, 73 ME. L. REV. 
45 (2021).  
72.  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984). 
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addition, “[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First 
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the 
content of their speech.”73 The children’s broadcasting rules both impose 
direct costs on the broadcasters and limit the amount of commercial time 
that may be sold during children’s broadcast, creating just such a financial 
burden on the broadcaster’s speech. If the restrictions are deemed to be 
content-based regulations, then the appropriate legal standard is one of 
strict scrutiny. When asked whether the children’s broadcast regulation “is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end,” it is quite unlikely the regulation could meet the strict 
scrutiny test.74 The government is free to provide children’s programs and 
support public broadcasting and many other initiatives to this end. 
Compelling speech would be very unlikely to meet this exacting standard. 
Nonetheless, given the overall amount of broadcast content, the 
requirement to set aside a small percentage for children’s programming can 
arguably be considered analogous to the requirement that cable systems set 
aside a small portion of their bandwidth for low power stations or local 
programs.75 The Supreme Court has explained that “under the intermediate 
level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations, [a regulation] 
would be sustained if it were shown to further an important or substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, provided 
the incidental restrictions did not ‘burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary to further’ those interests.”76 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, the Supreme Court found that “protecting noncable 
households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to 
competition from cable systems' is an important federal interest.”77 The 
concern over the loss of broadcast access would likely extend to the 
composition of the broadcast content as well as broadcasters themselves. 
Admittedly, this argument is somewhat undermined by the costs posted on 
broadcasters for children’s television content, given that Congress was 
concerned with “the economic viability of free local broadcast television 
and its ability to originate quality local programming will be seriously 
jeopardized.”78 Assuming Congress balanced the costs and savings of the 
Cable Act to achieve its compelling interests to promote broadcasting in the 
 
73. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 115 (1991). 
74.  Id. at 118; Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 
(1987). 
75.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997) (Turner 
II). 
76.  Id. 
77.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994)  
(quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)). 
78.  Turner II, 520 U.S. at 191 (quoting Cable Act § 2(a)(16)). 
516 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 499 
public interest, then the intermediate scrutiny test may afford sufficient 
discretion to allow Congress the power to balance these competing goals. 
Nonetheless, the same arguments made to support the must-carry rules in 
Turner seem to undermine the congressional mandates in the children’s 
programming arena. 
Beyond the FCC, other administrative agencies also use their 
administrative powers to impact First Amendment rights. This can be seen 
in the implementation of the CARES Act.79 The CARES Act is the federal 
funding program providing financial relief from the COVID-19 pandemic.80 
Under the CARES Act, PPP loans are available to any business which met 
the qualification of fewer than 500 employees or another employment 
ceiling established by the Small Business Administration (SBA).81 In the 
months following the roll-out of the emergency relief, the broader policies 
of the SBA’s lending ineligible rules have also raised free speech 
concerns.82 
For both the CARES Act loans and the other lending programs 
funded by Congress, the SBA has promulgated a list of businesses that it 
deems ineligible for financial support. These include government-owned 
entities, businesses engaged in any illegal activity, pyramid sales, nonprofit 
organizations, and many other categories.83 Although the SBA was formed 
in 1960, it was not until 1996 that the agency developed a list of ineligible 
 
79.  The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, PUB. 
L. NO.: 116-136 (2020). 
80.  CARES Act codified Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. § 
636(a)). 
81.  15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I-II). The specific language provides:  
During the covered period, in addition to small business 
concerns, any business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans 
organization, or Tribal business concern described in section 
657a(b)(2)(C) of this title shall be eligible to receive a [PPP] loan 
if the business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans 
organization, or Tribal business concern employs not more than 
the greater of- 
(I) 500 employees; or 
(II) if applicable, the size standard in number of employees 
established by the Administration for the industry in which the 
business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans organization, 
or Tribal business concern operates. 
82.  See, e.g., Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 
2020 WL 3489404, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020); Diocese of Rochester v. U.S. 
Small Bus. Admin., No. 6:20-cv-06243-EAW, 2020 WL 3071603, at *2 
(W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020); Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. 
Admin., No. 20-C-0601, 2020 WL 2088637, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020)). 
83. § 120.110 What businesses are ineligible for SBA business loans?, 13 
C.F.R. § 120.110 (Sept. 20, 2017). 
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businesses.84 The list is quite varied and the rationale for the inclusion on 
the list may include obvious concerns such as the use of government 
support for illegal purposes at one extreme, to the efficacy of government 
investments in life insurance at the other end of the list. 
In addition to the concerns regarding the use of the PPP funds, the 
SBA also singles out two fields based on the content of the message at the 
heart of their business: 
(k) Businesses principally engaged in teaching, instructing, 
counseling or indoctrinating religion or religious beliefs, 
whether in a religious or secular setting;  
. . . 
(p) Businesses which: 
(1) Present live performances of a prurient sexual 
nature; or 
(2) Derive directly or indirectly more than de minimis 
gross revenue through the sale of products or services, 
or the presentation of any depictions or displays, of a 
prurient sexual nature;. . .85  
The propriety of the SBA ineligibility rules must be assessed both 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to assure that the agency 
has operated within the bounds of its authority, as well as an independent 
First Amendment review to assure that Congress operated within its limits 
when granting the authority. If the regulation does not meet the APA 
standard, then there is no need to look beyond it for constitutional infirmity. 
The APA prohibits agencies from taking action “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”86 
The review under the APA is a two-step analysis provided in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.87 “[C]ourts must 
 
84.  DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-
10899, 2020 WL 2315880, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020) (“On January 31, 
1996, the SBA first declared certain types of businesses ineligible to participate in 
SBA lending programs (the ‘Original SBA Ineligibility Rule’).”). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2020). 
87.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
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determine whether the statute is ambiguous, applying the ordinary tools of 
statutory construction. If the statute is unambiguous, then the court applies 
it as-written; that is the end of the matter.”88 “If the statute is ambiguous on 
the point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpretation so long as the 
construction is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”89 Only 
when the legislation is silent or ambiguous does the court go further under 
the Chevron Doctrine. In the second stage, the court should “defer to the 
agency's construction if it is ‘permissible’—i.e., ‘within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation.’”90 
The application of the Chevron Doctrine is particularly interesting 
here because there seems to be no reported litigation challenging the SBA 
Ineligibility Rule until it was extended by the application of the CARES 
Act regarding participation in the PPP loan program. 
The underlying authority does not speak to eligibility requirements 
based on speech, sexual activities, or religious advocacy. Congress has 
provided the SBA with a comprehensive set of regulations involving its 
loan program.91 These powers, however, do not extend to the prohibition or 
 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984); see also Owensboro Health, Inc. v. U.S. HHS, 832 
F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2016). (Chevron two step analysis used to uphold HHS 
interpretation of Medicaid). 
88. Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 337-38 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
89. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
986 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
90. Arangure, 911 F.3d at 338 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
91. (a) Loans to small business concerns; allowable purposes; 
qualified business; restrictions and limitations 
 
The Administration is empowered to the extent and in such 
amounts as provided in advance in appropriation Acts to make 
loans for plant acquisition, construction, conversion, or 
expansion, including the acquisition of land, material, supplies, 
equipment, and working capital, and to make loans to any 
qualified small business concern, including those owned by 
qualified Indian tribes, for purposes of this chapter. Such 
financings may be made either directly or in cooperation with 
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regulation of either sexually prurient content or the regulation of religiously 
oriented content. While it would not be surprising for Congress to limit 
access to the adult entertainment industry,92 it would be quite another thing 
for Congress to disenfranchise for-profit businesses because of their 
religious activities.93 Some courts have found that the limitation on the PPP 
loans was inconsistent with the broad authority granted by Congress to 
provide PPP loans to “any business” with 500 or fewer employees,94 while 
others found the limitations consistent with the contextual understanding of 
the congressional purpose.95 In all cases, the courts accept that the SBA 
limitations were not inconsistent with the statutory language of the SBA 
Act prior to its amendment. By recognizing that Congress could have 
extended the funding of the PPP loans to companies previously ineligible, 
all the courts reviewing the question have acknowledged that the 
regulations meet the Chevron analysis.96 
Nonetheless, there still remains the question of whether the 
provisions limiting certain types of business would withstand a First 
Amendment analysis. Unlike regulations to prohibit speech, regulations to 
condition a public benefit on some aspects of speech are within the power 
of Congress. “[I]t is well established that the government can make content-
based distinctions when it subsidizes speech.”97 The government is free to 
choose who to support with its own funds. At the same time, however, the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests.”98 
Treating these funds as subsidies that the government is free to 
provide or to withhold, courts have found the PPP loan allocations are not 
 
banks or other financial institutions through agreements to 
participate on an immediate or deferred (guaranteed) basis. . . . 
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 636 (West). 
92. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Ashcroft 
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
93. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. PUB. L. NO. 103–
141 (1993) (prohibiting any agency from substantially burdening a person's 
exercise of religion). 
94. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 439 
F.Supp.3d 943, 2020 WL 2315880 (E.D. Mich. 2020). 
95. See Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020 
WL 3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020). 
96. See DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. Small Bus. Administration, 960 
F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 2020) (upholding the right of the adult business to seek PPP 
funding as provided by the amendment. The court noted that “[f]irst, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If 
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
97. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007). 
98.  Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
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inconsistent with the First Amendment.99 A review of the SBA funding 
priorities, however, suggests the SBA is making loan eligibility based on 
particular forms of speech the government does not want to support in 
addition to considerations about the credit-worthiness and likelihood of 
loan repayment. For example, if three video game producers with identical 
staffing and financial histories all applied for a loan, the company 
producing highly violent and graphical games would be eligible for the loan 
while the company producing games with sexual depictions of a “prurient 
sexual nature” would be barred, as would the videogame company 
producing games “teaching” comparative “religious beliefs” to be sold to 
private and public schools. 
The Supreme Court has recently undertaken an interpretation of 
similar regulations. In Matal v. Tam,100 the Supreme Court addressed the 
Lanham Act’s bar on the registration of disparaging trademarks. Two terms 
later, in Iancu v. Brunetti,101 the Supreme Court addressed the trademark 
registration “applying to marks that “[c]onsist[ ] of or comprise[ ] immoral[ 
] or scandalous matter.”102 
Trademark registration is not a prerequisite to trademark rights in 
the United States. For most business owners, the SBA loans are far more 
fundamental to their success and failure than the federal trademark 
registration. But like the SBA loans, they provide a significant benefit to the 
recipients. The court in Pharaoh acknowledged that “[e]ven if PPP loans 
are subsidies, however, that does not end the inquiry. The government may 
not make funding choices that are “the product of invidious viewpoint 
discrimination. . . .”103 
While the Pharaoh court used the right rule, it did not frame the 
correct question. It noted that “if the SBA had chosen to exclude only adult-
entertainment businesses from the PPP, Pharaohs would have a stronger 
argument that Congress was “invidious[ly]” seeking to “suppress[ ]” its 
type of speech.” Instead, the SBA, with congressional acquiescence, is 
doing precisely what the PTO had been doing in its trademark registrations, 
namely making its own determinations regarding when a particular business 
was operating as an adult entertainment company, a lobbying agency, a 
 
99. Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 2020 WL 
3406524, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 2020) (finding “that PPP loans are akin to the 
subsidy at issue in Regan, particularly in light of the PPP’s forgiveness 
provisions.”); Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020 
WL 3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (same). 
100. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
101. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
102. Id. at 2298 (quoting Lanham Act § 1052(a)) (brackets in original). 
103. Pharaohs GC, Inc. v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-CV-665, 2020 WL 
3489404, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (quoting Nat'l Endowment for the Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998). 
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religious teacher, or when these business offering their protected speech 
were not sufficiently objectionable to disqualify the business for a loan. 
In Iancu v. Brunetti, “[t]he Justices thus found common ground in a 
core postulate of free speech law: The government may not discriminate 
against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”104 The categories 
of excluded speech are not focused on specific businesses or the economic 
harms those businesses convey. It is particularly difficult to see the social 
harm of religious teaching, but irrespective of one’s view on that subject, 
the Bill of Rights has resolved that question on the side of protecting the 
religious speech. 
The decisions in Matal v. Tam105 and Iancu v. Brunetti106 in the 
sphere of trademark regulation should also be understood to have their 
consequence for similarly arbitrary decision-making among other 
regulatory agencies, even those as innocuous as the SBA. The choice to 
exclude certain businesses or people based solely on their message will 
require the regulations to meet constitutional scrutiny rather than merely the 
Chevron test. 
The role of content and viewpoint discrimination cuts across other 
areas of the law as well. For example, Christopher Roederer107 and 
Alexander Tsesis108 both raise concerns regarding the speech codes used on 
public university campuses. These authors point out that the efforts by the 
Department of Education, which began in 2010 with its Title IX Dear 
Colleague letter109 tended to conflate offensive speech with violations of 
Title IX.110 The guidance offered in the rescinded Dear Colleague letter 
 
104. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)) (explaining that viewpoint 
discrimination is an “egregious form of content discrimination” and is 
“presumptively unconstitutional”). 
105. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
106. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
107. Christopher J. Roederer, Free Speech on the Law School Campus: Is It 
the Hammer or the Wrecking Ball That Speaks?, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 26, 34 
(2018). See also Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995) (for a review of these concerns prior to the 2011 
action). 
108. Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1863 (2017). 
109. Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary 
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf; see Tsesis, supra note 108, at 1998-
99. 
110. The statutes that OCR enforces include . . . Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 19722 (Title IX), which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex; Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 19733 (Section 504). . . . School districts 
may violate these civil rights statutes and the Department’s 
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went well beyond the policies of Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education.111 In dealing with the extension of Title IX liability to a school 
district, the Davis Court explained that it did have a responsibility for 
student-on-student sexual harassment.112 At the same time, however, the 
Court made clear that this was not an expectation to stop any speech that 
might be deemed offensive. To be actionable, “a plaintiff must establish 
sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational 
experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to 
an institution's resources and opportunities.”113 Where such conduct occurs, 
the First Amendment concerns no longer limit the government’s right to 
punish the offending conduct. 
The Dear Colleague letter omitted such advice. While the effort to 
improve the vigor and effectiveness of campus responses to sexual 
predation was long overdue, the guidance had the effect of circumventing 
the APA, eliminating any need to hold the guidance up for public comment, 
and relying on non-judicial settlements to restrict speakers’ speech rights. 
As the dissent in Davis points out, the First Amendment must be 
respected when public universities create speech codes and sexual 
harassment policies.114 “A university's power to discipline its students for 
speech that may constitute sexual harassment, however, remains 
 
implementing regulations when peer harassment based on race, 
color, national origin, sex, or disability is sufficiently serious 
that it creates a hostile environment and such harassment is 
encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by 
school employees. . . . And, of course, even when bullying or 
harassment is not a civil rights violation, schools should still 
seek to prevent it in order to protect students from the physical 
and emotional harms that it may cause. 
Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary 
for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.pdf. The concern is that the 
if the speech is not a civil rights violation, it may well be protected speech. 
The letter ignores these countervailing considerations.  




114. Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. 
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (policy stuck down for vagueness and 
overbreadth); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.Supp. 
1163 (E.D.Wis.1991) (same); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F.Supp. 852 
(E.D.Mich.1989) (same); IOTA XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George 
Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993) (sanctions for “ugly woman contest” 
with “racist and sexist” overtones impermissible under the First Amendment). 
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circumscribed by the First Amendment.”115 The efforts to use 
administrative policies and non-legislative solutions to resolve the tension 
between free speech and communal standards simply cannot be 
implemented by ignoring judicial oversight or the competing First 
Amendment rights of all members of the campus community. 
II.  THE TRANSFORMATION FROM BROADCASTING TO SHARED AND 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
The challenge of regulating speech has changed dramatically in the 
twenty-first century because the nature of speech has changed as well. 
Those living through the twentieth century experienced a transformative 
experience as the mechanical player piano gave way to the phonograph116 
and the telegraph transformed into first radio,117 and then television.118 To 
provide perspective, it took 38 years for radio to reach an audience of 50 
million people but it took television only 13 years.119 The Internet required 
only four years.120 
“Media industries have customarily been defined in terms of a 
distinct product distributed in a particular way—books, magazines, 
television, radio, music, film, and video, for instance. In the new digital 
economy, the content provided by many of these formerly distinct 
 
115. Id. at 667. 
116. See KYLE BARNETT, RECORD CULTURES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY 21 (2020); JONATHAN STERNE, THE AUDIBLE PAST: 
CULTURAL ORIGINS OF SOUND REPRODUCTION 179 (2003); History of Phonograph 
– First Phonograph, SOUND RECORDING HISTORY, http://www.soundrecording
history.net/history-of-sound-recording/phonograph-history/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2020); see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) 
(discussing the dominance of the player piano roll and its lack of copyright 
protection). 
117. See BRIAN WINSTON MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A HISTORY: 
FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE INTERNET 74 (1998).  
118. See GARY EDGERTON, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
TELEVISION 125 (2009) (“The commercial realization of television in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s was even more lightning fast and momentous than that of radio 
during the mid 1920s.”); see also U.S. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, No. 5060, 
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 197 (1941) (hereinafter CHAIN BROADCASTING 
REPORT) (“The Commission found that at the end of 1938 there were 660 
commercial stations in the United States, and that 341 of these were affiliated with 
national networks.”). 
119. 50 Million Users: How Long Does It Take Tech To Reach This Milestone, 
INTERACTIVE SCHS., (Feb. 8, 2018), https://blog.interactiveschools.com/blog/50-
million-users-how-long-does-it-take-tech-to-reach-this-milestone (last visited Sept. 
21, 2020) (by comparison “[i]t took Facebook just two years to hit the 50 million 
mark. . . . YouTube and Twitter were even faster, 10 months and nine months 
respectively.”). 
120. Id. 
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industries can be distributed via the Internet. . . .”121 Communications 
theorists often turn to the visionary comments of Marshall McLuhan, who 
recognized the transformation being wrought by the “electronic age.”122 For 
McLuhan, the revolution was the advent of television and the electronic 
village that it created to transform a populace into a common people, who 
shared a unifying history and mythology. The 1969 launch of Sesame 
Street, for example, transformed the understanding of early education and 
prominently embraced integration and diversity, normalizing a world that 
was rarely to be seen on the actual streets of America.123 Gunsmoke and the 
Western genre created the American mythology;124 All in the Family 
captured and normalized the post-60s world of modern liberalism;125 
Modern Family broke taboos on homosexuality, helping promote the end to 
sex-based marital discrimination;126 The West Wing, educated (or 
 
121. COLIN HOSKINS, STUART MCFADYEN, ADAM FINN, MEDIA ECONOMICS: 
APPLYING ECONOMICS TO NEW AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA 1 (2004).  
122. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS 
OF MAN 152 (1994 ed.). See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG 
GALAXY (1962); MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE 
MASSAGE: AN INVENTORY OF EFFECTS (1967). See also Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging 
the Meme: Financing and Managing Disruptive Innovation, 10 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 441 (2012). 
123. See Lise Guernsey, How Sesame Street Changed the World, Newsweek, 
May 22, 2009, https://www.newsweek.com/how-sesame-street-changed-world-
80067 (last visited Sept. 2021) (“Sesame Street is no ordinary nonprofit. It is, 
arguably, the most important children's program in the history of television. No 
show has affected the way we think about education, parenting, childhood 
development and cultural diversity, both in the United States and abroad, more than 
Big Bird and friends.”). 
124. See Alfred Siewers, What I Learned About American Culture By Binging 
On ‘Gunsmoke’ And ‘House Of Cards,’ FEDERALIST, June 22, 2017, 
https://thefederalist.com/2017/06/22/what-i-learned-about-american-culture-by-
binging-on-gunsmoke-and-house-of-cards/ (last visited Sept. 2021) (“’Gunsmoke’ 
on CBS claims to be the world’s longest-running prime-time TV drama series with 
the same star and setting, from 1955 to 1975. One TV critic memorialized its 
Western mythology as ‘the Iliad and the Odyssey’ of America.”). 
125. See Sascha Cohen, How Archie Bunker Forever Changed in the American 
Sitcom, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 21, 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-
culture/history-working-class-families-american-sitcom-180968555/ (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2021) (“’All in the Family’ was a groundbreaking commercial success, 
ranking number one in the Neilsen ratings for five years. By 1975, one-fifth of the 
entire country was tuning in. . . . ‘All in the Family’ opened the floodgates for more 
representations of the working poor in 1970s situation comedies.”). 
126. See Spencer Kornhaber, The Modern Family Effect: Pop Culture’s Role 
in the Gay-Marriage Revolution, Atlantic, June 26, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.
com/entertainment/archive/2015/06/gay-marriage-legalized-modern-family-pop-
culture/397013/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2021) (“It’s impossible to know how much 
entertainment ever drives society rather than merely reflecting it. But it’s hard to 
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miseducated) the public on the inner life of American politics;127 and Fox 
News redefined and promoted the political conservative movement.128 
These programs shaped hundreds of millions of individuals' views 
and educated generations of viewers. “Television was the central element in 
the media-based public sphere in the last half of the twentieth century. It 
gathered by far the largest audience . . . Television was the key link 
between society’s public life and the private lives of citizens.”129 The 
norm—the status quo—was televised.130 
This, however, was not the only revolution. The rest of the world 
had a slightly different experience. Outside the United States, the role of the 
ubiquitous television broadcast was not merely the media industry’s effort 
to entertain and sell advertising. The traditional power over broadcasting 
held by many governments outside the United States requires a very 
different understanding of the relationship between speech and the 
government.131 “In Western Europe, . . . the state is understood as 
television’s most important guardian and financier, with television a strong 
means for the state to reach entire populations.”132 
The role of the media within each state is shaped by the politics and 
culture of that country, and in turn, helps to define the politics and 
 
avoid the feeling that the past five or six years have seen a virtuous cultural cycle. 
2009 was the year that audiences met Cam and Mitch, a gay couple living together 
with an adopted daughter.”). 
127. See Lynn Spigel, Entertainment Wars: Television Culture after 9/11, 56 
AM. Q. 2 (June 2004); Yair Rosenberg, Why 'The West Wing' Is a Terrible Guide to 
American Democracy, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1, 2012 (“European Union Foreign Minister 
Catherine Ashton told Newsweek in 2010 that she learned about America and ‘the 
mechanics of Washington life’ from being ‘an avid viewer of The West Wing.’”). 
128. See DAVID BROCK & ARI RABIN-HAVT, THE FOX EFFECT: HOW ROGER 
AILES TURNED A NETWORK INTO A PROPAGANDA MACHINE 11 (2012) (“the tail end 
of the 2008 election only marked the beginning of a larger transition at the 
network, one that would see Fox News change from a network that provided a 
conservative outlook on the news to an active and unapologetic mouthpiece for the 
Republican Party.”). 
129. JOSTEIN GRIPSRUD, RELOCATING TELEVISION: TELEVISION IN THE 
DIGITAL CONTEXT 3 (2010). 
130. Cf. Gil Scott-Heron, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, RCA/FLYING 
DUTCHMAN LABEL (1971) (illustrating the tension between the majority culture 
captured on television and the “revolutionary” culture reflected in the African-
American experience that was substantially excluded from popular media). 
131. See Alexander Dhoest, The persistence of national TV: Language and 
cultural proximity in Flemish fiction, in AFTER THE BREAK: TELEVISION THEORY 
TODAY 51 (Valck, Marijke de, and Jan Teurlings, ed., 2013). 
132. Id. (“From its start, European television was organized and regulated on 
the level of nation states, who sought to control the new medium, which they 
deemed important to support – but also to form – the nation as ‘one people’”). 
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culture.133 Such an approach is often framed by reference to competing 
conceptions of a public sphere and the competing models of self-
governance such concepts engendered.134 Such a dialectic is beyond the 
scope of this article. Nonetheless, a critical point remains that “democracy 
is more than the state, or a state with progressive social policies. But 
democracy needs the state as well as the public sphere of civil society. . . 
.”135 For Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere began in the coffee houses, 
voluntary associations, literary societies, and independent press. In the 
modern age, the phonograph, radio, movie palace, and television network 
undertook these same attributes. 
Where the television network answered to the political machine, 
however, it provided less opportunity for the public to direct its communal 
voice and more opportunity for the state to impose its will. Few nations 
outside the United States willingly chose to abstain from having an official 
government broadcasting service. And even in the United States, the FCC 
maintained sufficient control over the broadcasters through the license 
renewal process to assure that no broadcaster strayed too far from the 
consensus agenda of the government.136 
 
133. See Georgina Born, Digitising Democracy, POL. Q., 102, 106 (2006) 
(“scholars . . . tend to divide between those who emphasise the democratic benefits 
of media that afford a universal public address and those who advocate media 
systems that enable a pluralistic address among multiple, competing publics, or 
‘counter-publics.’”). 
134. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 31 (1991); 
see also Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: 
Areopagitica, the Stationers' Company, and the Statute of Anne, 12 Tul. J. Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 123, 124 (2009) (“In this influential study, Habermas describes the 
historical appearance of a new and distinctive social space which he refers to as the 
‘bourgeois public sphere.’”). See generally Jürgen Habermas, Further Reflections 
on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun. Ed. 
(1992); PAUL RUTHERFORD, ENDLESS PROPAGANDA: THE ADVERTISING OF PUBLIC 
GOODS (2000).  
135. David Abraham, Persistent Facts and Compelling Norms: Liberal 
Capitalism, Democratic Socialism, and the Law, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 939, 942, 944 
(1994) (“Habermas and the left were not then primarily concerned with pluralism. . 
. . Rather, the demand . . . was to lift or remove the social and communication 
distortions generated by the various social inequalities that the Keynesian welfare 
state had, in its mediation of capitalism and democracy, rationalized but not 
eliminated.”). 
136. See Hyman H. Goldin, Spare the Golden Goose” — The Aftermath of 
WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1021–22 (1970) 
(“When the delinquency or program deficiency is exceptional, the Commission 
places the offending licensee on probation by granting a license for only one year. 
The Commission's tolerance sometimes extends beyond one probationary term.”); 
Lili Levi, Not with A Bang but A Whimper: Broadcast License Renewal and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 247 (1996) (“In 
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With the dawn of the Internet, however, the grip of television and 
mass media is eroding into atomized media, socialized into the hands of 
every person holding a mobile phone or in reach of a computer. Where 
television in the United States was once controlled by a few national 
networks and in other nations often dominated by a single, government-
funded enterprise, the modern media landscape has become highly fractured 
and atomized.137 “Undeniably, the era of broadcast television as the prime 
mass medium is crumbling, making way for a more complex broadcasting 
landscape where diverse (niche, global, digital, interactive) channels divide 
the market, competing with other devices, media and cross-media 
applications.”138 
The change in the medium has fundamentally reshaped the nature 
of the message. 
Traditional media such as television, radio, or printed 
media have a one-dimensional character; they only work in 
one direction from the sender to the receiver without 
possibilities for mutual interaction. The interactivity of the 
Internet can extenuate the elitist character of traditional 
media; there is a shift from one-to-many to many-to-many 
and all-to-all communication. The technological 
networking of the world puts forward a new principle: all-
embracing, participative, networked cooperation and 
grassroots direct democracy in all realms of society. It is up 
to human beings to change society in such a way that it can 
make full use of and realize the opportunities the Internet 
poses.139 
This is not to suggest that radio or television have disappeared from 
the media landscape. Radio has the highest audience penetration among the 
various media, with monthly adult listening ranging in the 98–99% 
 
eliminating even the aspirational norm of a full-fledged comparison of competing 
applicants at the renewal stage, it abandons what was long articulated as a 
philosophical premise of the 1934 Communications Act: the FCC's role in selecting 
the applicant ‘best’ advancing the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”); J. 
Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 81 
(2004) (“Broadcast regulation can exploit sunk costs as a means of exerting control 
over the content of broadcast speech—to compel favored speech and to suppress 
disfavored speech.”). 
137. See Alexander Dhoest, The persistence of national TV: Language and 
cultural proximity in Flemish fiction, in AFTER THE BREAK: TELEVISION THEORY 
TODAY 51 (Valck, Marijke de, and Jan Teurlings, Ed.) (2013).  
138. Id. 
139. CHRISTIAN FUCHS, INTERNET AND SOCIETY: SOCIAL THEORY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 240 (2008). 
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levels.140 At the same time, however, audiences are shifting in how they 
access their radio and listening services. For example, podcasts have grown 
into a considerable medium as well, with “62 million U.S. listeners a week, 
a 22% audience penetration.”141 The national television networks continue 
to exist, but they are now in competition with a multitude of competitors, 
many of which are creating original programming and even offering live 
sports.142 
III.  NARROW TAILORING AND REGULATORY FAILURE 
Traditional media now fits within a much larger array of media 
options. The shift from the one-to-many to the all-to-all paradigm has 
radically restructured the understanding of the digital media’s role in the 
public sphere143 as well as the regulatory role for the allocation of scarce 
spectrum.144 
 
140. The Steady Reach of Radio: Winning Consumer Attention, NIELSEN, June 
17, 2019, https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2019/the-steady-reach-of-
radio-winning-consumers-attention/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) ([A]dults 18-49 
are the demographic that tunes in the most. The monthly reach for these listeners is 
132.4 million (98% of the population). . . . Adults 25-54 are the second most 
reached demographic for radio, with 123.6 million (99%) of the population 
listening each month.”). 
141. Robert Williams, Podcast ads will double share of audio market by 2022, 
study forecasts, MOBILE MARKETER, https://www.mobilemarketer.com/news/
podcast-ads-will-double-share-of-audio-market-by-2022-study-forecasts/553505/#:
~:text=Podcasts%20reach%2062%20million%20U.S.,over%20the%20next%20few
%20years (last visited Sept. 21, 2020). 
142. See Marc Berman, OTT: Is It Really a War or Competition?, TV 
TECHNOLOGY, Apr. 20, 2020, https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/ott-is-it-really-
a-war-or-competition (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) (noting more than 1200 “Over-
the-Top” Internet-enabled services. ““Linear is still the place to go for live 
programming and for sports, and that is not going to change,” said [Dan Rayburn, 
principal analyst, Frost & Sullivan.]. “Major sports are still going to stay on 
traditional TV distribution because those are the platforms that have the money to 
pay for it.”); Jacob Feldman, As the Digital Rights Battle Continues, Has a Sports 
Streaming Leader Emerged?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 2, 2019, 
https://www.si.com/media/2019/08/02/sports-streaming-leader-emerges-espn-nbc-
sports-bein-hbo-youtube-tnt (last visited Sept. 21, 2020). 
143. Christian Fuchs, Social Media and the Public Sphere, 12 TRIPLE-C 57 
(2014); see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
144. See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: 
Looking Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. 
REV. 529 (2020); Connor J. Suozzo, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and the 
Rise of Speech-Enhancing Regulations of Social Media Platforms, 4 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 215, 238 (2019); Lili Levi, A “Pay or Play” Experiment to Improve 
Children's Educational Television, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 275, 291 (2010); Clay 
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From a content standpoint, there is little role for the regulator. 
Nonetheless, there are examples of content regulation in the sphere of 
telephone communications, and in the context of all-to-all communications, 
it may be that the content regulation of telephony provides the most salient 
mileposts for analogous regulation. 
There are two primary areas of telephonic regulation related to 
content. The more successful regulations were aimed at unwanted telephone 
solicitations and the range of commercial and criminal scams that 
accompany such calls. In 1991, in response to the growing frustration over 
automated telephone solicitations into the home, Congress enacted the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).145 As a recent 
Supreme Court case explained, the scourge of these calls has not 
diminished since the adoption of the TCPA.146 “Americans passionately 
disagree about many things. But they are largely united in their disdain for 
robocalls. The Federal Government receives a staggering number of 
complaints about robocalls—3.7 million complaints in 2019 alone. The 
States likewise field a constant barrage of complaints.”147 
In enacting the TCPA, Congress found that banning 
robocalls was “the only effective means of protecting 
telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy 
invasion.” To that end, the TCPA imposed various 
restrictions on the use of automated telephone equipment. 
As relevant here, one restriction prohibited “any call (other 
than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the 
prior express consent of the called party) using any 
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 
prerecorded voice” to “any telephone number assigned to a 
paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized 
mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier 
service, or any service for which the called party is charged 
for the call.”148 
 
Calvert, The First Amendment, Compelled Speech & Minors: Jettisoning the FCC 
Mandate for Children's Television Programming, 107 KY. L.J. 35 (2019). 
145. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 
Stat. 2394, 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)) (“The use of the 
telephone to market goods and services to the home and other businesses is now 
pervasive due to the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques”); see 
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: 
First Amendment Lessons from the FCC’s TCPA Rules, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2018). 
146. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020). 
147. Id. at 2343. 
148. Id. at 2344. (internal quotations codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)). 
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The TCPA requirement of express, prior consent was originally 
limited to emergency purposes, but as discussed infra, it was amended in 
2015 to allow for debt collection on behalf of the U.S. government.149 The 
most significant regulatory aspect of the TCPA came in 2003 when the 
National Do Not Call Registry was added to the statute.150 The implement 
regulations of the Registry are codified under the Telemarketing Sales 
Rules of the FTC.151 
The TCPA regulations provide some interesting structural insights 
into the scope of regulation permitted under the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
(1) It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a 
violation of this Rule for a telemarketer to engage in, or for 
a seller to cause a telemarketer to engage in, the following 
conduct. . . . 
(iii) Initiating any outbound telephone call to a person 
when: 
(A) That person previously has stated that he or she does 
not wish to receive an outbound telephone call made by or 
on behalf of the seller whose goods or services are being 
offered or made on behalf of the charitable organization for 
which a charitable contribution is being solicited; or 
(B) That person's telephone number is on the “do-not-call” 
registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do 
not wish to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the 
purchase of goods or services unless the seller or 
telemarketer: 
(1) Can demonstrate that the seller has obtained the express 
agreement, in writing, of such person to place calls to that 
person. Such written agreement shall clearly evidence such 
person's authorization that calls made by or on behalf of a 
specific party may be placed to that person, and shall 
 
149. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emergency exceptions);  
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(b)(1)(B) (government debt collection exceptions); see also 
Hurwitz, supra note 145, at 10 (“requiring prior express consent is subject to a few 
statutory exceptions, including that such calls can be made for emergency purposes 
and for the purposes of collection of debts on behalf of the government.”). 
150. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108–10, 117 Stat. 557 
(2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2012)). 
151. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 et. cet. (2018). 
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include the telephone number to which the calls may be 
placed and the signature of that person; or 
(2) Can demonstrate that the seller has an established 
business relationship with such person, and that person has 
not stated that he or she does not wish to receive outbound 
telephone calls under paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of this 
section. . . .152 
As a result of the distinctions made among the very detailed list of 
abusive practices and authorized disclosures, it becomes clear that the use 
of the Do-Not-Call Registry has a soft spot based upon the limits of the 
FTC. “Placing your number on the National Do Not Call Registry will stop 
most telemarketing calls, but not all. Calls from or on behalf of political 
organizations, charities and telephone surveyors are permitted.”153 With 
regard to charitable solicitations, there is an additional distinction between 
the charity and the for-profit solicitors that charities sometimes use to 
conduct their solicitation:154 “Although callers who ask for charitable 
contributions do not have to search the national registry, a for-profit 
telemarketer calling on behalf of a charitable organization must honor your 
request not to receive calls on behalf of that charity.”155 
The structural explanation for the inclusion of for-profit charitable 
solicitation within a less-restrictive version of the Do-Not-Call regulations 
and the complete exclusion of charities and other non-profit organizations 
flows from the limitations of the FTC itself, which does not have 
jurisdiction over such enterprises.156 In consequence of the jurisdictional 
 
152. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(2018). 
153. FTC, The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Aug. 2016, https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0198-telemarketing-sales-rule. 
154. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); 
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 624 (1980) 
(holding as unconstitutional solicitation restrictions for nonprofits which require 
“that at least seventy-five per cent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used 
directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.”); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of 
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking down regulation that prohibited 
professional fundraisers from retaining an “unreasonable” or “excessive” fee); Ill., 
ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (upholding 
anti-fraud actions base, in part, on the excessive solicitation fees of 85% along with 
other misrepresentations as to the charitable use of the funds solicited). 
155. FTC, The Telemarketing Sales Rule, Aug. 2016, https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/articles/0198-telemarketing-sales-rule. 
156. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44 & 45(a); Federal Trade Commission Report to 
Congress Pursuant to the Do Not Call Implementation Act on Regulatory 
Coordination in Federal Telemarketing Laws (September 1, 2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-congress-pursuant-
do-not-call-implementation-act-regulatory (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) (“Although 
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impairment, the TCPA exempts calls from charities and political 
organizations while providing more limitation on for-profit charitable 
solicitors than the law exerts over other telemarketers. Interestingly, 
however, the lack of jurisdiction is not necessarily seen as a congressional 
preference. At least one court has missed the distinction, stating instead that 
“[f]or more than twenty years, the emergency and consent exemptions were 
the only statutory exemptions to the automated call ban.”157 Much like the 
telemarketers subject to the TCPA, this characterization is literally true and 
highly disingenuous. 
The Congressional distinctions are certainly not viewpoint related, 
but they do tend to suggest that some speakers have a more preferential role 
in robocalling than other speakers. This suggests Congress may be more 
concerned about the incidental burdens on the speech of non-profit political 
organizations and charities than on commercial operators. 
The practice of differential regulation, like that of the SBA 
regarding loan recipients might be permitted under the First Amendment, 
but these organizations are not receiving a governmental benefit. Instead, 
the civil and criminal penalties for conduct are being offered in different 
ways for the differently situated speakers. 
Rather than speculating about this distinction, however, the 
Supreme Court has provided its own guidance on the TCPA.158 In 2015, 
Congress amended the TCPA to provide yet another distinction between the 
various telemarketers. 
[I]n 2015, Congress passed and President Obama signed 
the Bipartisan Budget Act. . . .that Act amended the 
TCPA's restriction on robocalls to cell phones. It stated: 
“(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 227(b) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 227(b)) is 
amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1)— 
 
non-profit organizations are outside the jurisdiction of the FTC, § 1011 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), expanded the 
Telemarketing Act’s definition of ‘telemarketing’ to encompass any call soliciting 
a ‘charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other thing of 
value.’”). 
157. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n., 923 
F.3d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 2019), aff'd sub nom., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political 
Consultants, Inc.,140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020). 
158. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2344–45 (quoting 129 Stat. 588). 
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(A) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by inserting ‘, unless such call 
is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by 
the United States’ after ‘charged for the call.’” 
In other words, Congress carved out a new government-
debt exception to the general robocall restriction.159 
Fittingly, the plaintiffs in the case were the American Association 
of Political Consultants, the trade association for-profit telemarketing 
counterparts to the nonprofit political organizations.160 In a highly fractured 
opinion, six members of the Supreme Court agreed “that Congress has 
impermissibly favored debt-collection speech over political and other 
speech, in violation of the First Amendment.”161 
The various opinions of the decision concurred with the initial 
inquiry. “The initial First Amendment question is whether the robocall 
restriction, with the government-debt exception, is content-based. The 
answer is yes.”162 The plurality describes it simply:  
A robocall that says, “Please pay your government debt” is 
legal. A robocall that says, “Please donate to our political 
campaign” is illegal. That is about as content-based as it 
gets. Because the law favors speech made for collecting 
government debt over political and other speech, the law is 
a content-based restriction on speech.163 
The plurality opinion was unwilling to treat the regulation as 
limited to speakers rather than content or as a regulation of economic 
activity. Nonetheless, due to the variety of opinions in the decision, the 
Barr Court could not reach a majority on whether the government debt 
exception to the TCPA should be assessed under strict scrutiny or under an 
intermediate scrutiny standard.164 
 
159. Id. 
160. See AAPC, About Us, https://theaapc.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2020) (“AAPC members consist of political consultants, media consultants, 
pollsters, campaign managers, corporate public affairs officers, professors, fund-
raisers, lobbyists, congressional staffers and vendors. Membership is open to 
everyone associated with politics from the local level to the White House.”). 
161. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2343 (Justice Kavanaugh announced the judgment of 
the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Justice Alito 
join, and in which Justice Thomas joins as to Parts I and II. Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in judgment and Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part provided the majority for the decision in the case.) 
162. Id. at 2346. 
163. Id. 
164. See id. at 2356 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with much of the 
partial dissent's explanation that strict scrutiny should not apply to all content-based 
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In the concurrence that helped provide the essential fifth vote for 
the outcome of the case, Justice Sotomayor rejected the new law under an 
intermediate scrutiny standard165 on the basis of the law’s failure to provide 
a narrowly tailored provision designed to serve a significant government 
interest and the need to privilege this one aspect of speech. In addition, she 
found the government had not “sufficiently justified the differentiation 
between government-debt collection speech and other important categories 
of robocall speech, such as political speech, charitable fundraising, issue 
advocacy, commercial advertising, and the like.”166 
In the concurrence and dissent filed by Justice Gorsuch and joined 
by Justice Thomas, the dissent found the law unconstitutional but took a 
very different approach and offered a rather radical remedy. Justice 
Gorsuch began with the common understanding of the Court: 
First, no one doubts the TCPA regulates speech. Second, 
everyone accepts that restrictions on speech—no matter 
how evenhanded—must be justified by at least a 
“significant governmental interest.”167 And, third, the 
parties agree that laws that go further by regulating speech 
on the basis of content invite still greater scrutiny. When 
the government seeks to censor speech based on its content, 
favoring certain voices and punishing others, its restrictions 
must satisfy “strict scrutiny”—meaning they must be 
justified by interests that are “compelling,” not just 
significant.168  
Justice Gorsuch’s sliding scale of government interest provides a 
helpful frame of reference that would likely not meet the objection of any 
Justice on the Court. 
Justice Gorsuch goes on to find the TCPA a content restriction 
subject to strict scrutiny, a test it cannot pass. Justice Gorsuch, however, 
goes further than the majority, finding the TCPA itself unconstitutional,  
 
distinctions. . . . In my view, however, the government-debt exception in 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b) still fails intermediate scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve 
a significant governmental interest.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
165. See id. (the law ‘fails intermediate scrutiny because it is not “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
166. Id. at 2357 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
167. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (moved from 
the text). 
168. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2335 at 2364 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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It's easy enough to see why the government makes no effort 
to satisfy strict scrutiny. Now that most cell phone plans do 
not charge by the call, the only justification the government 
cites for its robocall ban is its interest in protecting 
consumer privacy. No one questions that protecting 
consumer privacy qualifies as a legitimate and “genuine” 
interest for the government to pursue. . . . But before the 
government may censor the plaintiffs’ speech based on its 
content, it must point to a compelling interest. And if the 
government thinks consumer privacy interests are 
insufficient to overcome its interest in collecting debts, it's 
hard to see how the government might invoke consumer 
privacy interests to justify banning private political 
speech.169 
This argument cuts much more broadly into the ability of regulators 
to enforce the myriad of time, place, and manner restrictions that are used 
to regulate commercial activities on the Internet.170 Without the challenge to 
the broader law, however, the plurality of justices ultimately determined 
that the government debt collection provision was unconstitutional, but that 
it could be severed from the remainder of the TCPA and left the remainder 
of the popular 1991 legislation untouched.171 
Fortunately for the federal administrative agencies, the plurality 
opinion provides far greater comfort than the approach proposed by Justice 
Gorsuch. The Supreme Court allows the FTC to continue the restrictions on 
predatory telemarketing practices.172 Since such conduct falls within 
generally recognized exceptions to the First Amendment, Congress is in its 
power to focus on the harms created by unfair and deceptive practices 
prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
At the same time, when the government undertakes to fix a 
perceived intrusion into the life of its residents, the variety of opinions on 
the court strongly suggest that there can be no preferred speakers or types 
of speech. 
The statutory authority for the FTC and its enforcement over the 
FCC’s TCPA regulations creates the anomaly that allows nonprofits to be 
exempt from the statutory provisions. Had Congress instead provided 
nonprofits explicit preferential treatment, the disparate interest might well 
have triggered another challenge to the TCPA. 
 
169. Id. 
170. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
171. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2353–54 (“the text of the Communications Act's 
severability clause requires that the Court sever the 2015 government-debt 
exception from the remainder of the statute.”). 
172. Id. at 2349. 
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IV.  A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE REGULATORY EFFORTS 
The challenges for Congress and regulatory agencies to manage the 
content and the conduct on the Internet are overwhelming in scope as well 
as increasingly political in nature. Both sides of the political aisle have 
become increasingly focused on the broad immunity provided by §230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA).173 Section 230 provides that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”174 As a result of this provision, Congress 
reversed the common law presumption that a republisher of another party’s 
content would also share in the liability for the defamatory nature of that 
content.175 In fact, Congress went quite a bit further. 
In the context of print publications and the pre-CDA Internet, the 
law made a distinction between publishers and distributors.176 
Ordinarily, one who repeats or otherwise republishes 
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had 
originally published it. With respect to entities such as 
news vendors, book stores, and libraries, however, New 
York courts have long held that vendors and distributors of 
defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know 
nor have reason to know of the defamation.177  
The CDA was designed to eliminate the ambiguity of determining 
whether online services providers and various billboard services were 
publishers that provided editorial control over the content or merely the 
vendors and distributors of their user’s content. The language, however, 
swept much more broadly and also eliminated the common expectation that 
vendors and distributors of defamatory publications will be liable if they 
know or have reason to know of defamation.178 
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,179 the plaintiff argued that the 
language of the statute made precisely this distinction: 
 
173. 47 U.S.C § 230 (2018); see George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall Street 
Shaped the Internet: A Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 
28 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 296 (2020). 
174. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
175. Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
176. Id. at 139. 
177. Id. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977). 
178. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010). 
179. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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According to Zeran, interactive computer service providers 
like AOL are normally considered instead to be 
distributors, like traditional news vendors or book sellers. 
Distributors cannot be held liable for defamatory 
statements contained in the materials they distribute unless 
it is proven at a minimum that they have actual knowledge 
of the defamatory statements upon which liability is 
predicated. [W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 113, at 810 (5th ed.1984)] (explaining 
that distributors are not liable “in the absence of proof that 
they knew or had reason to know of the existence of 
defamatory matter contained in matter published”).180 
The Fourth Circuit rejected this more facially accurate reading of 
the statute because “[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific 
speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”181 More than the policy 
concerns, the court also questioned the practicality of such a ruling. 
“Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer 
number of postings on interactive computer services would create an 
impossible burden in the Internet context.”182 
Rather than using the language of the statute or its legislative 
history, the Zeran Court made a balance of the interests of the rapidly 
growing Internet marketplace with the consequences of a chilling effect. 
Zeran quickly established the understanding of the statutory provision.183 
The broad immunity has swept aside the distributor immunity that exists 
under common law defamation for vendors and distributors of defamatory 
publications.184 “The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA 




182. Id. at 333. 
183. See Justin Nackley, "Oh, What A Tangled (World Wide) Web We Weave." 
the Dangers Facing Internet Service Providers, and Their Available Protections, 2 
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 20, 29 (2005). 
184. See Zeran,129 F.3d at 334; see also Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 
53,66 (2d Cir. 2019) (Facebook does not lose immunity despite its use of 
algorithms and editorial control to determine which content is promoted to its 
users); Michael Deturbide, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation 
in the US and Britain: Same Competing Interests, Different Responses, J. INFO. L. 
TECH. 1, 29 (2000) (“judicial interpretation on the scope of section 230(c)(1) has 
clearly indicated that the legislation, and the policies behind the legislation, 
required broad protection of ISPs from liability. Following these decisions, one 
might justifiably assert that, because of section 230, ISPs in the US are immune 
from liability for content carried on their services.”). 
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service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user 
of the service.’”185 
In addition to the broad general immunity granted under the CDA 
to be treated as neither publishers nor distributors, section (c)(2) of the law 
also gave editorial immunity to Internet companies, protecting them from 
whatever choices they make with regard to the selection of the content they 
provide.186 The immunity extends beyond defamation cases to include 
invasions of privacy and other potential torts. The law preempts state law 
but leaves intact the laws of intellectual property regulation.187 
These protections for the ISPs fueled the rise of some of the globe's 
most powerful companies, including Google, Facebook, Amazon as well as 
Apple and Microsoft, which saw their fortunes rise with the expansion of 
the digital economy. 
Section 230 succeeded beyond all expectations. Amazon 
was just two years old and still a precocious toddler in 
1996, with revenue just shy of $16 million that year; it 
brought in twice as much as that every hour (for a total of 
$70 billion) during the third quarter of 2019. Google, 
founded in 1998, two years after Section 230 became law, 
had third-quarter 2019 revenue of $40.3 billion. Facebook, 
founded in 2004, had $17.65 billion in third-quarter 2019 
revenue.188 
 
185. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Zeran,129 F.3d at 330). 
186. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2). 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to 
restrict access to material described in paragraph [(A)]. 
Id. 
187. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”). 
188. Ellen L. Weintraub & Thomas H. Moore, Section 230, 4 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 625, 626 (2020) (internal citations omitted). 
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What was once protective legislation designed to help a nascent industry 
avoid crippling litigation that would kill it in the cradle, the CDA has 
helped fuel an economic renaissance.189 
But the economic growth has come at some cost.190 “Choices by 
intermediaries surely matter beyond their utilitarian implications. 
Specifically, these choices matter for how they affect human values, be it 
immediately in each case settled or be it in overarching terms where the 
whole of intermediaries' decisions transform the normative landscape by 
reference to which we act.”191 
Within the context of the CDA, these concerns have led politicians 
and others on both sides of the political aisle to call for changes to the law. 
For example, in May 2020, President Trump issued an executive order, 
calling for regulations to remove the liability shield created by section 
230(c) of the CDA from social media platforms that censor speech to 
engage in political conduct.192  
The Trump executive order raised concerns about bias, censorship, 
and misuse of power. 
Online platforms are engaging in selective censorship that 
is harming our national discourse. Tens of thousands of 
Americans have reported, among other troubling behaviors, 
online platforms “flagging” content as inappropriate, even 
though it does not violate any stated terms of service; 
making unannounced and unexplained changes to company 
policies that have the effect of disfavoring certain 
viewpoints; and deleting content and entire accounts with 
no warning, no rationale, and no recourse.193 
President Trump was not alone. Former Vice President Joe Biden 
expressed a similar desire to repeal §230.194 Biden expressed concerns 
about the false publications, “concentration of power,” and “lack of 
 
189. See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED 
THE INTERNET (2019). 
190. See generally JULIE E. COHEN , BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019); MARIAROSARIA 
TADDEO AND LUCIANO FLORIDI, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ONLINE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi eds., 2017). 
191. Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility 
of Internet Intermediaries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783, 820 (2016). 
192. ¶ 50,343 EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PREVENTING ONLINE CENSORSHIP, Trade 
Reg. Rep. P 50343 [hereinafter TRUMP ORDER]. 
193. Id. 
194. Editorial Board, Joe Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), [https://perma.c
c/K8BT-PEVB]. 
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privacy.”195 He continued about Facebook, “[i]t is propagating falsehoods 
they know to be false, and we should be setting standards not unlike the 
Europeans are doing relative to privacy.”196 
Although the perspectives from the two political leaders were quite 
different, they overlapped in many ways. The resulting calls for change 
may draw some congressional consensus that finds common ground on very 
modest alterations with regard to perceived abuses by the intermediaries 
and the growing public concerns about disrespect of consumer privacy, the 
growth of abusive online content, election interference, and content 
published to mislead the public as to its origin and authenticity. For 
example, FTC Chairperson Ellen L. Weintraub has described the problem 
as follows: 
Unlike defamation, invasions of privacy, child 
pornography, terrorism, or copyright violations, the 
democracy-damaging information ecospheres Internet 
companies have created are not in and of themselves 
illegal. Americans deserve fair elections undistorted by 
Internet companies, but Congress has provided no statutory 
guarantee of that. 
Thus, Internet companies' democracy-damaging actions 
(exploiting humans' vulnerability to outraging material, 
creating filter bubbles that exacerbate polarization, 
programming for virality, and microtargeting), being not in 
and of themselves illegal, could not give rise to a legal 
cause of action based on current interpretations of Section 
230 immunity.197 
There is a compelling need to hold the companies that operate the 
modern Internet accountable for their actions when those actions further the 
dissemination of harmful speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment and when those actions further violations of criminal or civil 
law. Such an expectation is equally true of every business entity in the 
country; this is not holding the ISPs out for special treatment but merely 
recognizing that they have the same responsibility as all other enterprises. 
The civil rights of the nation’s citizens must be upheld, beginning with the 
First Amendment. But that also means that all laws and regulations are also 
respected within the context of their constitutionality. 
Faced with these seemingly intractable problems, Congress may 




197. Weintraub & Moore, supra note 188, at 633. 
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behemoths. That would have the benefit of providing excellent political 
theater and assuring that the law would be struck down as unconstitutional, 
which is what happened to most of the law that accompanied Section 
230.198 
The Supreme Court held most provisions of the original CDA 
unconstitutional because the law was not narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest and because less restrictive alternatives 
were available.199 A political rewrite of §230 to include some points of view 
but not others would undoubtedly provide the opportunity for political 
posturing, but it would be unlikely to be upheld by the Supreme Court.200 
The modification of §230 might also be problematic. Congress 
could, without too much tension with the First Amendment, seek to 
administratively or legislatively overturn Zeran. Since the statute never 
provided any waiver of liability for content providers that knowingly 
disseminate defamatory material or distributing such material with reckless 
disregard for the truth, the standard should not run afoul of the First 
Amendment.201 Under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, actual malice 
test, such content is not protected by the First Amendment and that should 
provide an opportunity for Congress to legislate or the administrative 
agencies to regulate in the field.202 Similarly, the noted privacy harms 
common on the Internet need not have Congressional protection broader 
than the constitutional protections afforded privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill.203 
The Zeran Court correctly noted that volume of offensive content 
creates a burden on the distributors of this content, but in the age of multi-
billion dollar enterprises, the government can reasonably decide that this is 
a cost that should be carried by these highly profitable institutions when 
weighed against the social harm created by the dissemination of knowingly 
false content. 
To avoid the concern that the change in the law will result in an 
inordinate amount of self-censorship by the ISPs or widespread over-use by 
 
198. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656 
(2004). 
199. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. at 661. 
200. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form of content discrimination 
[which] targets . . . particular views taken by speakers.”); Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 414 (1989); N.E. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 
938 F.3d 424, 432 (3d Cir. 2019). 
201. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
202. Id. at 279–80. 
203. Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 404 (1967) (“The power of a State to 
control and remedy such intrusion for newsgathering purposes cannot be denied.”) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
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a thin-skinned public, the Supreme Court has again provided guidance that 
the government could choose to adopt. 
In the area of obscene content, the law generally requires that an 
exhibitor or purveyor of potentially obscene materials is entitled to an 
adversarial proceeding and a final judicial determination that the materials 
are constitutionally unprotected.204 Once the defamatory content or the 
invasions of privacy lose the constitutional protections of the First 
Amendment, the law should not continue to protect the dissemination of the 
content when that dissemination can result in actual harm to the individuals 
targeted and more generally to the public as a whole. The additional 
protection for the ISPs, like the pornographers they sometimes emulate, is a 
procedural safeguard designed to assure that these enterprises are not forced 
to remove content against their will. 
Where the practices of obscenity extend to the laws of defamation 
and privacy, there would likely be some level of additional self-censorship. 
The same has proven true in traditional media. Many theater chains refuse 
to carry NC-17 content, even though its adult nature is generally considered 
to be separate from X-rated content.205 Nonetheless, adult content flourishes 
using other distribution strategies, and the loss of defamatory and privacy-
destroying content would not likely harm Facebook’s or Google’s bottom 
line. A mechanism that retained the adversarial process for assuring that 
content was not removed without first establishing that it is outside the First 
Amendment cannot intrude upon speech. In practice, it will likely only be 
used for a tiny fraction of the content that could be adjudicated as outside 
the First Amendment, but at least it would provide recourse in the most 
outrageous situations. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he Communications 
Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the 
Internet.”206 If the law can declare some pornography obscene, then 
certainly it can declare some factual misrepresentations as defamatory. 
 
204. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973) (citing Blount v. 
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968); 
Freedman v. Md., 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Kingsley Books, Inc., v. Brown, 354 
U.S., 436 443–45 (1957); U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-
369 (1971)). 
205. The 10 Most Successful NC-17 Films, StageBuddy, (Nov. 4, 2013), 
[https://perma.cc/8QQP-73HL], (“[M]ost of the large theater chains refuse to even 
screen films with an NC-17 rating, severely limiting those films' ability to attract 
audiences.”); NC-17 Rated: Stories Behind Some of Hollywood’s HOTTEST Titles, 
HDNet Movies, [https://perma.cc/TX9L-N69Y] (NC-17 “soon became the new ‘X’ 
rating, with distributors and movie theaters turning away films classified as NC-17. 
As recently as 2015, The Hollywood Reporter called the rating ‘box-office poison’ 
because the largest theater chains refuse to show films limited to those 17 years of 
age or older.”). 
206. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Congress, administrative agencies, and the courts should also 
consider the nature of the knowledge that can give rise to liability. As noted 
in Cubby and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a distributor could be held 
liable if the distributor “knew or had reason to know” of the libelous 
content.207 The New York Times v. Sullivan standard for liability use the 
unfortunate term “actual malice” to reflect the knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of the truth.208 In other settings, a common label for such 
awareness is labeled “scienter.”209 The labels likely reflect a common 
standard.210 “The Sullivan actual malice standard is essentially identical to 
the scienter element of securities fraud because both standards require a 
showing of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity.”211  
At the same time, the heightened protections afforded to speech 
may result in procedural differences with regard to proof.212 Sullivan also 
 
A website operator can be both a service provider and a content 
provider: If it passively displays content that is created entirely 
by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to 
that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or is 
“responsible, in whole or in part” for creating or developing, the 
website is also a content provider. Thus, a website may be 
immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the 
public but be subject to liability for other content. 
Id. (citing Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1262–63 
(N.D.Cal.2006)) (Yahoo! is not immune under the CDA for allegedly 
creating fake profiles on its own dating website). 
207. See Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977). 
208. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)(Constitutional 
protections are lost for a defamatory falsehood made “with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”). 
209. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 
(2007) (“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a 
plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted 
intentionally or recklessly . . . .”). 
210. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, 
n.19 (1984) (“Under what has been characterized as the ‘honest liar’ formula, fraud 
could be proved ‘when it is shewn [sic] that a false representation has been made 
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether 
it be true or false.”). 
211. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment 
and Securities Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 942–43 (2014). 
212. Id. 
The burden of proof and appellate review standard are lower in 
securities fraud cases than under Sullivan and its progeny. First, 
Sullivan requires actual malice to be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. In the securities fraud context, however, 
scienter need merely be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. This differential evidentiary burden, which is 
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used a “‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard . . . —that is, whether 
the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual 
malice had been shown with convincing clarity.”213 The Supreme Court 
reinforced this requirement in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc.,, explaining “[t]he burden of proving ‘actual malice’ requires 
the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively 
entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.”214 The 
understanding of any revised enforcement action must clarify and reflect 
this pre-existing model. Distributors should be held to the scienter standard 
with regard to their knowledge. When the only question revolves around 
speech rights, then the “reckless disregard” standard under the label scienter 
should be used. The courts should continue to apply the heightened 
procedural protections of the actual malice standard, without perhaps 
continuing to use the term. Clarification over the application of the conduct 
for which the ISPs will be held responsible will narrow the focus of 
regulation and assure the companies and the public that mere negligence is 
not being criminalized. 
Turning to modification of §230(c)(2), any changes to the “Good 
Samaritan” immunity provisions are likely much more difficult to advance. 
The nature of this provision expands immunity from the enforcement of 
censorship laws, again through the definition of publisher. 
This provision protects the ISP from becoming an “Information 
Content Provider” as a result of its editorial control over the content on its 
site that the ISP finds sufficiently distasteful to host. “The term 
‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.”215 When the ISP takes good-faith steps to restrict objectionable 
material by selectively controlling what is published or by deleting 
offensive content, the protections of §230(c)(2) eliminate the risk that the 
ISP can be now considered an Information Content Provider and subject to 
liability either to the original party posting the content or to any third party 
harmed by the content that was let posted. 
The problem with §230(c)(2) is that it is presently outside the First 
Amendment because of its vagueness and inapplicability. Although it has a 
good faith requirement, the courts have not seriously questioned the 
availability of the legal protection on that basis. That means any content 
 
incorporated into the summary judgment inquiry, is potentially 
outcome-determinative.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
213. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); see Sullivan, 
376 U.S. at 285–86). 
214. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511 n. 30.  
215. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
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objectionable to the ISP can be removed by the ISP with full civil 
immunity. If Congress were to amend the provision, however, so that some 
content received this immunity, that would necessarily mean that speakers 
wishing to say something else were treated differently. This would not 
matter if it were restricted to obscenity and other forms of unprotected 
speech, but the disparate treatment might not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny if, for example, there was no civil immunity for pro-Communist 
speech. 
The government is entitled to prefer some speakers over others, 
particularly when funding speech.216 In contrast, the Supreme Court 
distinguished “the case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on 
the basis of speech content.”217 By removing the “otherwise objectionable” 
caveat to the section, or worse, by picking particular types of content for 
additional immunity and rejecting other types of content for such immunity, 
the government would be signaling that speech it promotes and that speech 
it seeks to suppress. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, “the threat 
of sanctions may deter the exercise of First Amendment rights almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions.”218 
Such selective immunity is merely the flipside of the “right of 
reply” statutes declared unconstitutional in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo219 in which the Supreme Court refused to uphold a duty to afford a 
political candidate the right to reply in the paper. As the Court noted in 
Miami Herald, “[g]overnmental restraint on publishing need not fall into 
familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on 
governmental powers.”220 The Court made clear that a “compulsion exerted 
by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise 
print”221 or use such rules to instruct the publisher regarding what “should 
not be published is unconstitutional.”222 
Selective benefits for some viewpoints or for select ISPs that avoid 
certain types of content are not the traditional form of viewpoint censorship 
 
216. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194–95 (1991) (“[W]e have here not the 
case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech 
content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, 
which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.”). 
217. Id. at 194. 
218. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 588 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) 
(internal quotation and brackets omitted). 
219. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (“A 
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not 




546 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 499 
typical of the cases involving newspapers and radio, but the principles still 
apply in the modern world of the many-to-many digital environment. 
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,223 the 
Court upheld limitations on lobbying by tax-exempt organizations, 
explaining “a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a 
fundamental right does not infringe the right.”224 Nonetheless, the next 
term, in Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters 
of California, the Court struck down similar editorial controls on public 
broadcasting stations.225 The Court has recognized that the distinction 
between restrictions and benefits is narrow and sometimes illusory.226 The 
axiom of Regan has narrowed considerably with time, and it narrows much, 
much further when viewpoints rather than blanket prohibitions are 
involved. 
The role of Congress and administrative agencies must also be 
viewed both through the lens of the Miami Herald Court’s decision to strike 
down the Florida right of reply statute and the more recent decisions in 
Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti. Tam struck down the Lanham Act’s 
restrictions on trademarks that disparaged persons, living or dead.227 Iancu 
v. Brunetti extended the Court’s restrictions on the discretion of the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO) by striking down the provisions of the 
Lanham Act that allowed the PTO to deny trademark registrations for 
immoral and scandalous matter.228 
The Brunetti Court reaffirmed the position of Justice Kennedy that 
the Lanham Act had used viewpoint discrimination in the disparagement 
test because it “allowed a trademark owner to register a mark if it was 
‘positive’ about a person, but not if it was ‘derogatory.’” That was the 
“essence of viewpoint discrimination,” he continued, because “[t]he law 
thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds 
offensive.”229 
 
223. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 
(1983); F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 407 (1984). 
224. Id. at 549. 
225. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 402. 
226. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today seeks to avoid 
the thrust of [Regan] by pointing out that a public broadcasting station is barred 
from editorializing with its nonfederal funds even though it may receive only a 
minor fraction of its income from CPB grants.”). 
227. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct., 1744, 1764–65 (2017). 
228. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (“[T]o determine whether 
a mark fits in the category, the PTO asks whether a ‘substantial composite of the 
general public’ would find the mark ‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or 
propriety’; ‘giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings’; ‘calling out for 
condemnation’; ‘disgraceful’; ‘offensive’; ‘disreputable’; or ‘vulgar.’”). 
229. Id. at 2299 (2019) (quoting Tam, 137 S. Ct.at 1751–52 (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.). 
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The Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA provide precisely the 
same type of viewpoint discrimination as do the provisions of the Lanham 
Act that have been declared unconstitutional by Congress. The difference is 
that the language does not restrict the ISP to that objectionable content 
identified by Congress, but it instead offers its congressional imprimatur to 
any content the ISP chooses to suppress or redact. Were Congress to 
provide the benefit to only those viewpoints it favors rather than letting the 
ISP decide, the situation becomes much more like Brunetti.230 
There is a difference between a governmental benefit and a 
restriction. That same argument, however, was made in Tam and Brunetti 
because trademark registration is a voluntary benefit to trademark holders 
that does not stop any trademark owner from using their non-federally 
registered mark.231 The Court noted, however, that trademark ownership 
provides valuable benefits.232 One can scarcely argue that the immunity 
from lawsuits under the CDA is less valuable than the protection of some 
defenses to trademark infringement afforded by the national registration 
scheme. Both provide essentially the same form of protection against legal 
challenges. The use of words like “lewd,” “filthy,” “excessively violent” 
(but not reasonably violent)233 are vague and viewpoint laden. Nor did 
Congress want this paragraph limited to unprotected speech, since it 
included the clarifying explanation that the immunity was available 
“whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”234 
The blanket immunity under the Good Samaritan law does not run 
afoul of viewpoint neutrality. Anything less than blanket immunity, 
however, will likely be held unconstitutional. Neither Congress nor the 
administrative agencies will have any success narrowing the provision to 
less than all speech unless it was narrowed to cover only unprotected 
obscenity and similar speech outside the First Amendment. 
Although Congress cannot regulate content based on its viewpoint, 
it retains the power to regulate conduct based on its harms. The lead 
regulatory agency to accomplish this is the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC or Commission). Congress retains the authority to hold ISPs 
accountable where the actions of the third parties were illegal and the ISP 
had knowledge of the illegal conduct. To find such a road forward, the FTC 
provides the government its most likely regulator. 
In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTC Act).235 The authority of the FTC was expanded by Congress in 
 
230. 47 U.S.C § 230(a)(4). 
231. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 2297 (“Registration of a mark is not mandatory. The 
owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce and enforce it against 
infringers.”). 
232. Id. 
233. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  
234. Id. 
235. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63–203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). 
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1938.236 Section 5 of the FTC Act declares that “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared unlawful.”237 “The 
amendment added the phrase ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ to the 
section's original ban on ‘unfair methods of competition’ and thus made it 
clear that Congress, through §5, charged the FTC with protecting 
consumers as well as competitors.”238 Although many of the actions taken 
by the FTC result in a settlement action or consent decree, the FTC may 
bring suit to prohibit an unfair business practice or a deceptive action when 
such settlement cannot be reached.239 The FTC brings actions under either 
the unfair or the deceptive label, though many complaints reference actions 
that cover both.240 “The FTC Act directs the Commission to ‘prevent’ the 
broad set of entities under its jurisdiction ‘from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.’”241 
Without attempting to regulate the content of the Internet in any 
way, Congress could direct the FTC to enforce the existing laws regarding 
cyberbullying, invasions of privacy, and similar societal harms, provided 
that the speech was not protected by the First Amendment. There would 
likely be a chilling effect, which in this case is likely the desired result of 
encouraging more civil and constrained behavior. After all, there is no 
marketplace of ideas, when all that can be heard is the shouting of an angry 
mob. Every marketplace has normative expectations that allow it to operate, 
and the various social media vendors on the Internet are no different. 
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COMMISSION (Oct. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-
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investigation, the Commission may initiate an enforcement action using either an 
administrative or judicial process if it has “reason to believe” that the law is being 
or has been violated.”). 
240. See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
2015); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir.1988) 
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practice.”). 
241. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 768 (1999) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a)(2)). 
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To fulfill its duty under §5 of the FTC Act, the agency often 
publishes guidance, which provides non-binding but highly persuasive 
information that enterprises can use to understand the consequences of their 
commercial activities and the potential for civil or criminal penalties if they 
choose to ignore that guidance. For example, in Federal Trade Commission 
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,242 the FTC brought a successful action 
against Wyndham Worldwide Corp. for operating a data security regime 
that was ineffective to stop repeated cyberattacks. In response to the 
defense that Wyndham did not have fair notice of the FTC’s position on the 
unfair practices involved in providing substandard security, the Third 
Circuit noted the FTC guidebook provided significant information and 
provided the defendant with fair notice.243 
The guidance, however, merely helps to educate the public. As the 
court explained, “the relevant question is not whether Wyndham had fair 
notice of the FTC's interpretation of the statute, but whether Wyndham had 
fair notice of what the statute itself requires.”244 
For conduct to be determined unfair, the FTC Act looks to see if 
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and 
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”245 Deceptive practices are those “involving a material 
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer 
acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”246 
In the area of privacy and data security, the FTC has taken 
increasingly aggressive steps to reign in some of the most egregious 
behavior of the ISPs.247 Although many critics, including the President of 
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243. Id. at 256. 
244. Id. at 253–54 (italics in original). 
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The Commission shall have no authority under this section or 
section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on 
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consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
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practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established 
public policies as evidence to be considered with all other 
evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a 
primary basis for such determination. 
Id. 
246. FTC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, supra note 237 (citing FTC Policy 
Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)).  
247. See, e.g., U.S. v. Facebook, Inc., 456 F.Supp.3d. 115, 117 (D.D.C. 2020) 
(For violating the 2012 consent decree, the FTC negotiated a new order that “would 
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the United States and the former Vice President of the United States, 
believe that Section 5 of the FTC Act is insufficient to change the behavior 
of the largest U.S. conglomerates, it provides an excellent alternative to the 
challenges regarding the implications of affecting the rights to speech of the 
ISPs or their consumers. 
Unlike unwanted speech, which is protected by the First 
Amendment except for narrow categories outside the Constitution’s 
protection, unwanted conduct can result in civil or criminal liability. In the 
case of Facebook, for example, a five billion dollar penalty, though small in 
comparison to the company’s revenue, was still a dramatic increase in the 
assertion of FTC authority.248 
With the guidance of Congress, the FTC could do much more. 
Without violating the First Amendment, it could enforce a standard of 
knowing complicity or reckless disregard against the corporations that 
facilitate breaches of existing criminal laws and civil regulations. 
Moreover, the FTC is not alone. The states also have state trade protection 
laws and consumer protection laws to expand the power of the 
regulations.249 The state consumer protection acts (CPAs) significantly 
expand the resources beyond that of the FTC, in part because “a primary 
means of achieving the CPAs' consumer protection goal is the private 
action that empowered consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys 
general.”250 The addition of the interest in the states’ attorneys general and 
the private bar would leverage the body of law established by the FTC into 
a practical enforcement regime, provided the FTC was successful in 
establishing precedent first. 
The FTC has shown its ability to move cautiously, providing 
guidance and direction to eliminate concerns over vagueness and fair notice 
before moving against those companies that ignore the explicit parameters 
of enforcement. In doing so, the FTC can retain some relevance in the 
future development of the Internet, assuring that deceptive practices are not 
shielded by the misapplication of the First Amendment, and purveyors of 
harmful, unfair practices are held accountable. 
The efforts of the FTC and the states must remain mindful of the 
rights protected by the First Amendment. Many critics of the current status 
of online social media may fear that this approach is not enough to protect 
the public from the current level of harms. Nonetheless, the Court’s 
understanding of the First Amendment must serve as the framework in 
 
require Facebook to pay a $5 billion civil money penalty—by far the largest 
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2021] RESTRICTING ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN CYBERSPACE 551 
which the regulators address these concerns, and there is more than enough 
improper conduct to keep the dockets of the FTC and the states busy for 
years to come. It may not be an ideal solution, but it is an important and 
pragmatic step forward. 
CONCLUSION 
The Internet has been a boon to the modern age, creating economic 
opportunities, connecting people around the globe, and providing a new 
model of many-to-many discourse. At the same time, for many, the benefits 
of the Internet are being tarnished by the ease with which defamatory 
content, invasions of privacy, and other actions are occurring online. In the 
face of the conflicting success and failures of the Internet, the U.S. 
government has struggled to find its regulatory footing. 
Congress would do well to recognize the limits created by the 
current jurisprudence on the First Amendment. Enacting regulations that are 
declared unconstitutional merely increases the delays in solutions for the 
public and enables those violating enforceable laws to avoid the scrutiny of 
the regulators. At the same time, there is a compelling need to hold 
everyone accountable for their actions when those actions further the 
dissemination of harmful speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment and when those actions further violations of criminal or civil 
law. Such an expectation is equally true of every business entity in the 
country. This is not holding the ISPs out for special treatment, but merely 
recognizing that they have the same responsibility as all other enterprises. 
Congress will not accomplish this goal by interfering with the 
speech rights of the ISPs, but it can use the obligations that arise under the 
criminal and civil statutes when a party has actual knowledge or operates 
with reckless disregard for the truth. By using the longstanding and 
effective processes of the FTC Act and holding companies accountable for 
the actual knowledge they acquire, the government can create a regulatory 
regime that is constitutional and better than the model now in use. 
 
 
